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ABSTRACT
The integration of world capital markets carries important implications for the design and impact
of tax policies. This paper evaluates research findings on international taxation, drawing attention to
connections and inconsistencies between theoretical and empirical observations.
Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) note that small open economies incur very high costs in attempting
to tax the returns to local capital investment, since local factors bear the burden of such taxes in the form
of productive inefficiencies. Richman (1963) argues that countries may simultaneously want to tax the
worldwide capital income of domestic residents, implying that any taxes paid to foreign governments
should be merely deductible from domestic taxable income.
Governments do not adopt policies that are consistent with these forecasts. Corporate income is
taxed at high rates by wealthy countries, and most countries either exempt foreign-source income of
domestic multinationals from tax, or else provide credits rather than deductions for taxes paid abroad.
Furthermore, individual investors can use various methods to avoid domestic taxes on their foreign-source
incomes, in the process also avoiding taxes on their domestic-source incomes.
Individual and firm behavior also differs from that forecast by simple theories. Observed
portfolios are not fully diversified worldwide. Foreign direct investment is common even when it faces
tax penalties relative to other investment in host countries. While economic activity, and tax avoidance
activity, is highly responsive to tax rates and tax structure, there are many aspects of tax-motivated
behavior that are difficult to reconcile with simple microeconomic incentives.
There are promising recent efforts to reconcile observations with theory. To the extent that
multinational firms possess intangible capital on which they earn returns with foreign direct investment,
even small countries may have a degree of market power, leading to fiscal externalities. Tax avoidance
is pervasive, generating further fiscal externalities. These concepts are useful in explaining behavior, and
observed tax policies, and they also suggest that international agreements have the potential to improve
the efficiency of tax systems worldwide.
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The design of sensible tax policies for modern economies requires that careful attention be 
paid to their international ramifications.  This is a potentially daunting prospect, since the analysis 
of tax design in open economies entails all of the complications and intricacies that appear in closed 
economies, with the addition of many others, since multiple, possibly interacting, tax systems are 
involved.  These complications are no less harrowing for a researcher interested in studying the 
impact of taxation in open economies.  Fortunately, the parallel development of theoretical and 
empirical research on taxation in open economies offers straightforward and general guidance for 
understanding the determinants and effects of tax policies, as well as their normative significance.  
The purpose of this chapter is to review the analysis of international taxation, drawing connections 
to research findings that are familiar from the analysis of taxation in closed economies. 
The rapid development of open-economy tax analysis in the last fifteen or so years differs 
sharply from previous patterns, when the bulk of the academic research on taxation posited that the 
national economy was closed.  In this literature the implications for tax policy of international trade 
and international factor movements typically consisted of a short discussion at the conclusion of a 
long analysis.  In studies of closed economies, real and financial activity cannot cross international 
borders, so that prices clear each national market separately.  This restriction to a closed economy 
characterized not only much of the theoretical work on optimal tax policy but also most of the 
general equilibrium models of the effects of taxes, e.g. Fullerton, Shoven, and Whalley (1978) or 
Auerbach and Kotlikoff (1987), and even most of the econometric studies of tax policy and 
behavior.   
To be fair, the assumption of a closed economy was widely thought to have been an 
adequate approximation of at least the American economy over much of the postwar period.  As   2
seen below, this assumption also succeeded in eliminating many complications that otherwise must 
be faced in thinking about tax policy.  However, with the growing importance not only of 
international trade in goods and services but also of multinational corporations, together with 
increasing integration of world capital markets, it is becoming more and more important to rethink 
past work on tax policy in an open economy setting. 
  As described in section 2 below, many aspects of tax policy analysis are affected by the 
openness of the economy.  For example, while in a closed economy it does not matter whether a 
proportional tax is imposed on income from saving or income from investment (since aggregate 
saving equals aggregate investment), in an open economy this equivalence no longer holds.  
Furthermore, taxpayer responses to policy changes can look very different once the implications of 
an open economy are taken into account.  In a closed economy, the analysis of the incidence of a 
tax on saving or investment depends on its effect on the market clearing interest rate, which in 
equilibrium depends on the price elasticities of both individual savings and firms' factor demand for 
capital.  In contrast, in a small open economy, the interest rate is determined by the world capital 
market, so is unaffected by a tax.  Similarly, the incidence of commodity taxes becomes simpler in 
a small open economy, since the relative prices of at least tradable goods are again set on world 
markets and therefore do not respond to tax changes.
1  Results on factor price equalization even 
suggest that market wage rates should not be affected by tax policy, in spite of the lack of mobility 
of people across borders.  In all of these cases, the absence of price changes means that quantity 
changes will be larger, generally raising the implied efficiency costs of tax distortions. 
A greater complication is that the range of behavioral responses to tax policy becomes 
broader in an open economy setting.  This paper explores in detail the types of behavioral responses 
                                                 
1 World markets greatly dampen the price effects of tax changes from the standpoint of a small open economy, but 
since these price changes apply to a very large world economy, their net effect on world welfare need not be negligible.   3
that theory forecasts, and that appear in practice.  Differential income tax rates on profits earned by 
different industries can change the pattern of trade flows, leading to increased exports from 
industries receiving more favorable tax treatment.  The location decisions of firms earning above 
normal profits are likely to be particularly sensitive to tax differentials.  Individual investors not 
only choose among domestic debt and equity securities but can also invest in equivalent securities 
abroad.  Similarly, taxes can affect the financial as well as operational behavior of multinational 
firms.  Not only do tax rates affect choices of where to locate foreign affiliates, but taxes also 
influence the optimal scale of foreign operations, the location of borrowing, research activity, 
exports, and a host of other decisions.  A multinational firm has a certain degree of discretion in 
choosing the prices used to conduct transactions between members of its affiliated group, allowing 
it to report accounting profits in tax-favored locations.  
All of these aspects of behavior depend on the tax systems of home and foreign countries.  
A country’s tax base and even its comparative advantage therefore depend on differences between 
tax structures across countries.  As a result, in any analysis of policy setting, the nature of 
interactions among tax policies in different countries becomes an important issue.  To the extent 
that international tax competition makes tax policies in one country a function of those in other 
countries, the importance of such interactions is magnified. 
Any analysis of tax policy in an open economy setting must reconcile the frequent 
inconsistency of observed behavior with the forecasts from simple models.  Standard models of 
portfolio choice, for example, forecast that risk-averse investors will hold diversified portfolios of 
equities issued worldwide, yet observed portfolios tend to be heavily specialized in domestic 
equity.  The standard assumption of costless mobility of capital across locations appears to be 
inconsistent with the evidence that domestic savings is highly correlated with domestic investment.    4
As seen below, the behavior of multinational firms is also frequently inconsistent with the forecasts 
of standard models.  Furthermore, observed tax policies often deviate sharply from those predicted 
by standard models.  As the chapter argues in section five, some of the added considerations that 
have been used to explain observed individual and firm behavior may also help explain observed 
tax policies.   
Section two of this chapter reviews the theory of optimal tax-setting in open economies, 
starting with the problems faced by governments of small countries.  Section three generalizes 
these implications to a more realistic setting.   Section four focuses on taxes and portfolio choice, in 
an attempt to reconcile the theory with the observed “home bias.”   Section five surveys evidence of 
the impact of taxation on the activities of multinational firms, while section six offers a 
reconciliation of the evidence of behavior of taxpayers and governments in open economies. 
 
2.  Optimal Income Taxation in an Open Economy 
   This section considers the implications of optimal tax theory for the design of taxes in open 
economies.  For additional detail on optimal tax structures, see the chapter by Auerbach and Hines 
in volume three of this Handbook. 
The nature of optimal tax policy often depends critically on whether the economy is open or 
closed.  The importance of this distinction is evident immediately from the difference that 
economic openness makes for tax incidence.  In a closed economy, the incidence of a tax on the 
return to capital depends not only on the elasticity of saving with respect to the interest rate but also 
on the elasticity of factor demands and the elasticity of consumer substitution between capital-
intensive and labor-intensive goods.  The presumption has been that, for plausible elasticities, the 
burden of a corporate income tax falls primarily on capital owners.   5
In a small open economy, in contrast, a tax on the return to domestic capital has no effect on 
the rate of return available to domestic savers,
2 since the domestic interest rate is determined by the 
world capital market.  Domestic investment falls in response to higher tax rates.  For firms to 
continue to break even, in spite of the added tax, either output prices must rise or other costs must 
fall by enough to offset the tax.  When output prices are fixed by competition with imports, the tax 
simply causes the market-clearing wage rate to fall.  As a result, the burden of the tax is borne 
entirely by labor or other fixed domestic factors.  While a labor income tax would also reduce the 
net wage rate, it would not in contrast distort the marginal return to capital invested at home vs. 
abroad.  Following Diamond and Mirrlees (1971), a labor income tax dominates a corporate income 
tax, even from the perspective of labor.
3  As a result, one immediate and strong conclusion about 
tax policy in an open economy setting is that a “source-based tax” on capital income should not be 
used since it is dominated by a labor-income tax. 
 
2.1.  Choice of tax instrument 
 
It is useful to illustrate this finding in a simple setting in which the government has access 
to various tax instruments, at least including a source-based tax on capital, a payroll tax, and 
consumption taxes on any nontraded goods.   The country is small relative to both the international 
capital market and the international goods markets, so takes as given the interest rate, r
*, on the 
world capital market, and the vector of prices, p
*, for traded goods.   
Resident i receives indirect utility equal to 
** (, , , ( 1 ) ) ( ) in n i vp s p srw t VG ++ − + , where pn 
represents the vector of prices for nontraded goods, s and s
* respectively represent the sales tax rate 
                                                 
2 This follows from the standard assumptions that capital is costlessly mobile internationally and there is no   6
on tradables and nontradables, r* represents the rate of return to savings available on the world 
capital market, w equals the domestic wage rate, t is the tax rate on labor income, and G is a vector 
of government expenditures. 
Each dollar of capital employed by domestic firms faces a tax at rate τ.  Domestic firms 
have constant returns to scale, and operate in a competitive environment, so must just break even in 
equilibrium.  Therefore, the unit costs for firms in each industry must equal the output price in that 
industry.  Using c and cn to denote the costs of producing traded and nontraded goods, respectively, 
equilibrium requires that, for traded goods,
4 
** (, ) cr w p τ +≥ , while for nontraded goods 
* (, ) nn cr w p τ += .   Since the country is assumed to be a price taker in both the traded goods market 
and the capital market, it follows immediately that firms in the traded sector continue to break even 
when τ increases only if the wage rate falls by enough to offset the added costs due to the tax.  This 
implies that 








 in which K/L is the equilibrium capital/labor ratio in these firms.
5  Hence, the effect of taxation on 
domestic factor prices is determined by competition in traded goods industries. 
For firms selling nontradables, the market-clearing price of their output must adjust to 
ensure that these firms continue to break even.  The break-even condition is given by 
() w L r K q p n n n n + + = τ * , in which qn is the quantity of nontraded output, and Kn and Ln are 
                                                                                                                                                                 
uncertainty.   
3 Dixit (1985) provides a detailed and elegant development of this argument. 
4 This equation is satisfied with an equality whenever the good is produced domestically.   
5 Note that this implies specialization in one particular industry, since this condition cannot simultaneously be satisfied 
for different industries selling tradables that have different capital/labor ratios.  In equilibrium, a higher tax rate will 
cause the country to specialize in a less capital-intensive industry.  See Lovely (1989) for further discussion.   7
quantities of capital and labor used in its production.  Differentiating this condition, and imposing 
(2.1), implies that 





















Prices rise in sectors of the economy that are more capital intensive than the traded goods sector, 
and fall in sectors that are more labor intensive.   
Consider the government’s choice of τ.  By increasing τ, individuals are affected only 
indirectly, through the resulting drop in the market-clearing wage rate and through changes in the 
market-clearing prices of nontradables.
6  The same changes in effective prices faced by individuals 
could equally well have been achieved by changing appropriately the payroll tax rate t, and the 
sales tax rates sn.  From an individual’s perspective, an increase in τ is equivalent to changes in the 
payroll tax rate, t, and the sales tax rates sn, that generate the same changes in after-tax wages and 
prices.   
Since these alternative policies are equivalent from the perspective of individual utility, 
holding G fixed, it is possible to compare their relative merits by observing what happens to 
government revenue as τ rises, while the payroll tax rate t, and the sales tax rates sn are adjusted as 
needed to keep all consumer prices unaffected.   Given the overall resource constraint for the 
economy, the value of domestic output, measured at world prices, plus net income from capital 
exports/imports must continue to equal the value of domestic consumption and saving plus 
government expenditures.  Therefore,
7 
(2.3)      () ( ) [] m a m g K r S C L K S f p G p * , * − + − + = , 
                                                 
6 Note that individual returns to saving are unaffected by τ , since this is a tax on investment in the domestic economy, 
while returns to saving are fixed by the world capital market.   8
in which pg measures the production cost of each type of government expenditure,  () ⋅ f  is the 
economy’s aggregate production function, S measures the net savings of domestic individuals, C is 
their consumption, Km measures capital imports/exports, and La is aggregate labor supply. 
If τ increases, but its effect on consumer prices is offset through suitable readjustments in 
the payroll tax and in sales tax rates, then S, C, and L will all remain unaffected.  Welfare is 
maximized if the tax rates are chosen so that the resulting value of Km maximizes the value of 
resources available for government expenditures.  Given the aggregate resource constraint, this 
implies that 
**
K p fr = .  Firms would choose this allocation, however, only if τ = 0.  Under optimal 
policies, therefore, there should be no source-based tax on capital.  Any capital tax prevents the 
country from taking full advantage of the gains from trade. 
The choice of tax instrument carries implications for optimal levels of government 
expenditure.  Since the use of source-based capital taxes entails a higher welfare cost than does the 
alternative of raising revenue with wage and sales taxes, it follows that welfare-maximizing 
governments constrained to use capital taxes will generally spend less on government services than 
will governments with access to other taxes.  Of course, one might wonder why an otherwise-
optimizing government would resort to capital taxes in a setting in which welfare-superior 
alternatives are available.  A number of studies put this consideration aside, constraining the 
government to use capital taxes, in order to analyze the implications of tax base mobility for 
government size.
8 
In cases in which individual utility functions are additively separable in private and public 
goods, optimal government spending levels are lower with capital taxes whenever marginal 
                                                                                                                                                                 
7 The discussion is simplified here by ignoring government purchases of nontradables.  Tax changes do affect the prices 
of nontradables, but they imply equal changes in both government revenue and expenditures, so that these price 
changes have no net effect on the government budget.   
8 See, for example, Wilson (1986), Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), and Hoyt (1991).   9
deadweight losses increase with tax levels.   This conclusion follows directly from the preceding 
analysis, since at any given individual welfare level capital taxation generates less tax revenue than 
does wage and sales taxation.  Optimal government spending requires that the marginal cost of 
raising additional revenue equal the marginal benefits of government services.  Consequently, if the 
marginal cost of raising revenue is an increasing function of tax levels, then moving from wage to 
capital taxation entails lower utility levels, higher marginal costs for any given spending level, and 
therefore reduced government spending.  While there are odd circumstances in which the marginal 
cost of raising revenue falls at higher tax rates,
9 more standard cases entail rising marginal costs, 
and therefore smaller government if funded by capital taxes. 
This model can also be used to analyze the optimal tax rate on income from savings. 
Analysis of the optimal taxation of capital income in a closed economy (reviewed in the chapter by 
Auerbach and Hines) is largely unaffected when cast in a small open economy.  Since the before-
tax interest rate is unaffected by the tax, the incidence of the tax now falls entirely on capital 
owners.  As a result, the change in savings due to a tax change can be larger than in a closed 
economy, but wage rates will be unaffected.  The same distributional considerations that might lead 
a government to tax savings in a closed economy may justify such a tax as well in an open 
economy. 
The results derived by Diamond and Mirrlees (1971) still imply that production will be 
efficient under an optimal tax system, as long as there are no relevant restrictions on the types of 
commodity taxes or factor taxes available.  As a result, under such a “residence-based tax” on 
capital, residents should face the same tax rate on their return to savings regardless of the industries 
                                                 
9 See, for example, Atkinson and Stern (1974), and the discussion in the Auerbach and Hines chapter in volume 3 of 
this Handbook.   10
or countries in whose financial securities they invest.
10  These results also imply that foreign 
investors in the domestic economy should not be taxed -- in a small open economy domestic 
workers would bear the burden of the tax. 
Another immediate implication of the findings of Diamond and Mirrlees concerning 
productive efficiency under an optimal tax system is that a small open economy should not impose 
differential taxes on firms based on their location or the product they produce.  This not only rules 
out tariffs but also differential corporate tax rates by industry.  As shown by Razin and Sadka 
(1991b), this equilibrium set of tax policies implies that marginal changes in tax policy in other 
small countries will have no effects on domestic welfare.  Behavioral changes in some other small 
economy can induce marginal changes in trade patterns or capital flows.  Such changes in behavior 
have no direct effect on individual utility by the envelope condition.  They therefore affect 
domestic welfare only to the degree to which they affect government revenue.  Under the optimal 
tax system, however, marginal changes in trade patterns or capital imports also have no effect on 
tax revenue.  Therefore, there are no fiscal spillovers under the optimal tax system, and the Nash 
equilibrium tax structure among a set of small open economies cannot be improved on through 
cooperation among countries. 
 
2.2.  Taxation of foreign income 
The taxation of foreign income under an optimal residence-based tax system has received 
particular attention.  When host countries impose source taxation on income earned locally by 
foreign investors, the use of residence-based taxation in capital exporting countries raises the 
                                                 
10 Naito (1999) shows, however, that these results no longer necessarily hold once one drops the assumption that 
different types of workers are perfect substitutes in production. Without this assumption, a marginally higher tax rate 
on capital in industries employing primarily skilled labor, for example, will be borne primarily by skilled workers, 
providing a valuable supplement to a nonlinear income tax.  11
possibility that foreign investment income might be double taxed.  From a theoretical standpoint it 
is tempting to discount this possibility, since while countries may well choose to tax the income 
from savings that individuals receive on their worldwide investments, they should not find it 
attractive to impose source-based taxes on the return to capital physically located within their 
borders.  In practice, however, all large countries impose corporate income taxes on the return to 
capital located therein.  As a result, cross-border investments are taxed both in host and home 
countries.  The combined effective tax rate could easily be prohibitive, given that corporate tax 
rates hovered near 50 percent in the recent past.  To preserve cross-border investments, either the 
home or the host government must act to alleviate this double taxation.  While the theory forecasts 
that such prohibitive tax rates would not arise because host governments would not tax this income, 
what instead happens is that home governments have offered tax relief of some sort on the foreign 
income earned by resident firms and individuals.  The modern analysis of this issue started with 
the work of Peggy Richman (1963), who noted that countries have incentives to tax the foreign 
incomes of their residents while allowing tax deductions for any foreign taxes paid.  This argument 
reflects incentives to allocate capital between foreign and domestic uses, and can be easily 
illustrated in a model in which firms produce foreign output with a production function 
() ** , * f KL that is a function of foreign capital and labor, respectively, and produce domestic 
output according to  () , f KL, a function of domestic capital and labor.  All investments are equity 
financed, and the foreign government taxes profits accruing to local investments at rate  * τ .  From 
the standpoint of the home country, the total returns (the sum of private after-tax profits plus any 
home-country tax revenues
11) to foreign investment are: 
                                                 
11 This formulation treats private income and government tax revenue as equivalent from a welfare standpoint, which is 
sensible only in a first-best setting without other distortions.  Horst (1980), Slemrod et al. (1997), Keen and Piekkola 
(1997), and Hines (1999b) evaluate the impact of various tax and nontax distortions on the optimal tax treatment of   12
(2.4)      () ( ) * * ,* **1 * fK L w L τ −−   , 
while total returns to domestic investment are: 
( 2 . 5 )       [] (,) f KL w L − . 
For a fixed stock of total capital () K , the allocation of capital between domestic and foreign 
uses that maximizes the sum of (2.4) and (2.5) subject to the constraint that () K K K ≤ + *  is: 
( 2 . 6 )        () /*1 * kk ff τ =− . 
If the home country imposes a tax on domestic profits at rate τ, then to preserve the desired 
allocation of capital expressed by equation (2.6), it must also tax foreign profits net of foreign taxes 
at the same rate τ.Denoting the residual home country tax on foreign profits by  r τ , a firm receives 
() ( ) * * ,* **1 * r fK L w L τ τ −− −    from its investment in the foreign market, and 
() () ,1 fK L w L τ −−    from its investment in the domestic market; profit-maximizing capital 
allocation therefore implies: 












Equation (2.7) is consistent with (2.6) only if  () * 1 τ τ τ − = r , which means that the home 
government subjects after-tax foreign income to taxation at the same rate as domestic income. The 
logic of this outcome is that, from the standpoint of the home country government, foreign tax 
obligations represent costs like any other (such as wages paid to foreign workers), and should 
therefore receive analogous tax treatment. 
  In practice, most tax systems do not in fact tax foreign income in this way.  Richman offers 
the interpretation that governments may adopt policies designed to enhance world rather than 
                                                                                                                                                                 
foreign income.   13
national welfare.  She notes that, from the standpoint of home and foreign governments acting in 
concert, the appropriate maximand is the sum of pre-tax incomes: 
(2.8)      () ( ) ** , * * * , f KL w L fK L w L −+ −       . 
Maximizing the sum in (2.8) subject to the capital constraint yields the familiar condition that 
* kk f f = , which, from (2.7), is satisfied by decentralized decision makers if  () * τ τ τ − = r .  As will 
be described shortly, this condition is characteristic of the taxation of foreign income with full 
provision for foreign tax credits, a policy that broadly describes the practices of a number of large 
capital exporting countries, including the United States. 
 
3.  Tax complications in open economies 
  This section considers extensions of the simple model of optimal taxation in open 
economies.  These extensions incorporate the difficulty of enforcing residence-based taxation, the 
optimal policies of countries that are large enough to affect world prices or the behavior of other 
governments, the time inconsistency of certain optimal policies, and the effects of fiscal 
externalities. 
 
3.1.  Increased enforcement problems in open economies 
The analysis in section two assumes that tax rules can be costlessly enforced.  While this 
assumption can of course be questioned even in a closed economy, the potential enforcement 
problems in an open economy are much more severe.  Consider, for example, the enforcement of a 
tax on an individual’s return to savings.  This return takes the form primarily of dividends, interest, 
and accruing capital gains.  Enforcement of taxes on capital gains is particularly difficult, but even 
taxes on dividends and interest face severe enforcement problems in an open economy.   14
In a closed economy, taxes on dividend and interest income can be effectively enforced by 
having firms and financial intermediaries report directly to the government amounts paid in 
dividends and interest to each domestic resident.
12  Without this alternative source of information to 
the government, individuals face little incentive to report their financial earnings accurately and 
enforcement would be very difficult. 
In an open economy, however, individuals can potentially receive dividends and interest 
income from any firm or financial intermediary worldwide.  Yet governments can impose reporting 
requirements only on domestic firms and intermediaries.  As a result, individuals may be able to 
avoid domestic taxes on dividends and interest they receive from foreign firms and intermediaries.  
This is true even if the dividends or interest originate from domestic firms, if the recipient appears 
to be foreign according to available records.
13  Furthermore, states competing for foreign 
investment accounts have incentives to help individual investors maintain secrecy and therefore 
hide their foreign investment income from the domestic tax authorities.  Of course, individuals 
would still have incentives to report all interest payments and tax losses, so on net the attempt to 
tax capital income should result in a loss of tax revenue.
14  
Based on the presumed ease of evasion through this use of foreign financial intermediaries, 
Razin and Sadka (1991a) forecast that no taxes on the return to savings can survive in an open 
economy.  Any taxes would simply induce investors to divert their funds through a foreign 
financial intermediary, even if they continue to invest in domestic assets.  Of course, use of foreign 
financial intermediaries may not be costless.  The main costs, though, are likely to be the relatively 
fixed costs of judging how vulnerable the investment might be due to differing regulatory oversight 
                                                 
12 With a flat tax rate on the return to savings, the government can simply withhold taxes on interest and dividend 
payments at the firm or financial intermediary level, with rates perhaps varying with the nationality of the recipient. 
13 Note that the optimal tax policies analyzed in section two would exempt foreigners from domestic taxation.   15
(in practice as well as in law) in the foreign country.  Individuals with large savings would still 
likely find it worth the fixed cost to find a reliable foreign intermediary, so that the tax would fall 
primarily on small savers.  Enforcement problems therefore give the tax unintended distributional 
features and higher efficiency costs (by inducing individuals to shift their savings abroad as well as 
to reduce their savings).  As the costs of using foreign intermediaries drop over time due to the 
growing integration of financial markets, these pressures to reduce tax rates become larger.  There 
is considerable controversy in interpreting recent European tax developments, but some argue that 
tax rates within Europe are falling in response to such international pressures.
15 
A uniform tax on the return to savings, consistent with the results in Diamond and Mirrlees 
(1971), should tax accruing capital gains at the same rate as dividends and interest.  The taxation of 
capital gains, however, is an administrative problem even in a closed economy.  In a closed 
economy, financial intermediaries may have information on the sales revenue from most assets 
sales for each domestic resident, but they would rarely have information about the original 
purchase price.  Therefore, a tax on realized capital gains is difficult to enforce.  Even if it were 
enforceable, it is not equivalent to a tax on capital gains at accrual, since investors can defer tax 
liabilities until they choose to sell their assets.
16  The practice has instead been to tax accruing 
capital gains primarily at the firm level by imposing corporate taxes on retained earnings that 
                                                                                                                                                                 
14 See, for example, Gordon and Slemrod (1988), Kalambokitis (1992), or Shoven (1991) for evidence that the U.S. tax 
system lost revenue from attempting to tax capital income, at least in the years analyzed  (1975-1986). 
15 See, for example, the papers collected in Cnossen (2000). 
16 In principle, the tax rate paid at realization can be adjusted to make the tax equivalent to a tax at accrual. See 
Auerbach (1991) or Bradford (1996) for further discussion.  No country has attempted such a compensating 
adjustment in tax rate, however.  Many countries, though, have imposed a reduced rate on realized capital gains, to 
lessen the incentive to postpone realizations, thereby further lowering the effective tax rate on capital gains compared 
to that on dividends and interest.   16
generate these capital gains.
17  The lower is the effective tax rate on realized capital gains at the 
individual level, the higher would be the appropriate tax rate on accruing gains at the firm level. 
Under the equivalent tax system in a small open economy, the government would need to 
tax corporate retained earnings to the extent that shares are owned by domestic residents.  Such 
taxes are inconsistent with current international tax practice.  Imposing instead a higher tax rate at 
realization on foreign-source capital gains would be difficult, since the government cannot learn 
directly about the sale of an asset if the investor uses a foreign financial intermediary, and again the 
high rate generates a costly “lock-in” effect.   
One method of addressing these enforcement problems is for countries to establish bilateral 
information-sharing agreements that provide for exchange of information to aid in the enforcement 
of domestic residence-based taxes.  However, these agreements have been undermined by various 
tax havens that enable domestic investors to acquire anonymity when they invest, facilitating 
avoidance of residence-based taxes on capital income.  As Yang (1996) notes, as long as there is 
one country that remains completely outside this network of information-sharing agreements, then 
evasion activity would in theory be left unaffected -- all savings would simply flow through the 
sole remaining tax haven.  Recent sharp efforts by the OECD (2000) to encourage all countries to 
share information on foreign bank accounts and investment earnings of foreign investors are 
intended to prevent their use to avoid home-country taxes. 
Gordon (1992) and Slemrod (1988) argue that an international agreement to impose 
withholding taxes on any financial income paid to tax haven intermediaries, at a rate equal to the 
maximum residence-based income tax rate, would be sufficient to eliminate the use of tax havens to 
avoid taxes on income earned elsewhere.  Again, however, any one country on its own would not 
                                                 
17 In some countries, most notably the United States, profits rather than retained earnings have been taxed, subjecting 
dividend income to double taxation.  Many countries, though, have adopted dividend imputation schemes that rebate   17
have an incentive to impose such a withholding tax on payments made to tax haven financial 
intermediaries, so an international agreement among all countries would be necessary to implement 
such a policy.   
Some countries attempt to enforce their tax systems by preventing individuals from 
purchasing foreign securities while still allowing domestic multinationals to establish foreign 
operations.
18  The benefit of imposing such controls is that enforcement problems are much less 
severe when taxing domestic firms than when taxing domestic individuals on their foreign-source 
incomes.  Under existing tax conventions domestic governments have the right to tax retained 
earnings accruing abroad to domestic multinationals, even if they cannot tax these retained earnings 
when individuals invest abroad.  In addition, multinationals need to submit independently audited 
accounting statements in each country in which they operate, providing tax authorities an 
independent source of information about the firms' earnings that is not available for portfolio 
investors.  If multinational firms can be monitored fully and portfolio investment abroad 
successfully banned,
19 then this approach solves the enforcement problem.  Since multinationals 
can take advantage of the same investment opportunities abroad that individual investors can, the 
models do not immediately point out any efficiency loss from such a channeling of investments 
abroad through multinationals.  Capital controls can therefore provide an effective means of 
making avoidance of domestic taxes much more difficult, facilitating much higher tax rates on 
income from savings.  Gordon and Jun (1993) show that countries with temporary capital controls 
also had dramatically higher tax rates on income from savings during the years in which they 
                                                                                                                                                                 
corporate taxes collected on profits paid out as dividends.
18 During the 1980's, controls of roughly this form existed in such countries as Australia, France, Italy, Japan, and 
Sweden.  See Razin and Sadka (1991a) for a theoretical defense of this approach. 
19 Enforcement of taxes discouraging or banning portfolio investment in foreign assets remains difficult, however.  
Gros (1990) and Gordon and Jun (1993) both report evidence of substantial ownership of foreign financial assets by 
investors in countries with capital controls, held through foreign financial intermediaries.  18
maintained the capital controls.  For example, Australia had capital controls until 1984.  Until then, 
the top personal tax rate on dividend income was 60 percent.  By 1988, taking into account both the 
drop in the top tax rate and the introduction of a dividend tax credit, Australia’s net marginal tax 
rate had fallen to eight percent.  Similarly, Sweden had capital controls until 1988.  At that date, the 
top marginal tax rate was 74 percent, but two years later it had fallen to 30 percent.  Capital 
controls are difficult and costly to enforce, however, and can prevent individuals from taking 
advantage of sound economic reasons for investing in foreign assets.  As a result, many countries 
have abandoned capital controls in recent years, reopening the problem of enforcing a tax on the 
return to savings.  
 
3.2.  Countries that affect market prices 
The models described above made strong use of the assumption that a country is a price 
taker in world markets.  There are several reasons, however, for questioning this assumption. 
The first possibility, discussed at length by Dixit (1985), is that a country may have a 
sufficiently dominant position in certain markets that its exports or imports can have noticeable 
effects on world prices.  Yet unless the domestic industry is monopolized, the country will not take 
advantage of this market power without government intervention.  Therefore, tariffs can be used to 
gain at the expense of foreign producers and consumers.
20  As a simple example, assume that the 
domestic production cost of some exportable good, X, is p(X), while the revenue received in world 
markets from the export of X equals q(X)X.  Then the exporting country’s desired value of X 
satisfies p' = q + Xq'.  It follows that q > p', so price exceeds marginal cost.  This allocation can be 
achieved by use of an export tariff at rate t satisfying t = -Xq'.   19
Similarly, if a country is large relative to world capital markets, so that the size of its capital 
exports and imports affects world interest rates, then the country has an incentive to intervene to 
take advantage of its market power.  If it is a net capital importer, then it would want to restrict 
imports in order to lower the rate of return required on the world market.  One approach to 
restricting imports is to impose a withholding tax on payments of dividends or interest to foreign 
investors in the domestic economy.  Conversely, a capital exporter would want to restrict exports, 
e.g. by imposing a surtax on financial income received from abroad.  These implications are 
apparent from differentiating the country’s budget constraint (2.3) with respect to Km, permitting 
the world interest rate r* to be a function of Km.  The first-order condition for budget (and thus 
welfare) maximization becomes: 




K r f p
*
* * + = . 
This condition characterizes private sector economic activity if the government imposes a tax on 
interest payments (or a subsidy on interest receipts) at a rate equal to the elasticity of the world 














While net capital flows from the largest countries have the potential to affect world interest 
rates,
21 tax policy in these countries has not changed in the ways forecast when net capital flows 
changed.  For example, the United States did not increase withholding taxes on financial payments 
to foreign investors when it became a large capital importer in the 1980's -- in fact, it eliminated its 
withholding tax on portfolio interest income in 1984. Withholding tax rates are also quite similar in 
                                                                                                                                                                 
20 In an intertemporal context, Gordon (1988) argues that countries will also have incentives to reduce their current 
account deficits or surpluses in efforts to maintain the optimal quantity of exports period by period.  Summers (1988) 
provides evidence that countries do in fact attempt to limit their current account deficits and surpluses.
21 For example, the extra capital demand in the United States following its tax cuts in the early 1980’s, and in Germany 
following reunification, are contemporaneous with higher world interest rates.  See, e.g., Sinn (1988).  20
capital exporting and capital importing countries.  Apparently, a country's effects on world interest 
rates are too small to generate any noticeable response. 
When the return to capital invested in different countries is uncertain, with outcomes not 
fully correlated across countries,
22 then even small countries may have some market power in 
world capital markets.  Each country's securities provide investors a source of diversification not 
available elsewhere, and as a result, exhibit downward sloping demand curves.  For example, if 
returns across countries are independent, then a CAPM-type model would imply that the expected 
rate of return, r
e, that investors require in order to be willing to invest an extra unit of capital in 
country n equals: 
( 3 . 2 )       
2 * n ni
e K r r σ ρ + = , 
in which σn is the standard deviation in the return to a unit of capital invested in country n, Kni is 
the amount of capital in country n owned by investor i, r* is a risk-free opportunity cost of funds, 
and ρ measures the investor’s risk aversion.   
Rather than facing a fixed cost, r*, per unit of capital acquired from abroad, equation (3.2) 
instead implies that the marginal cost of acquiring funds on the world market is an upward sloping 
function of the total volume of funds acquired.  Each domestic firm, however, would take the cost 
of funds, r
e, as given in making its investment decisions, and therefore ignore the effects of its extra 
investment on the cost of funds faced by other domestic firms. Based on standard optimal tariff 
considerations, it follows that a country has an incentive to intervene to reduce the amount of 
domestic equity acquired by foreign investors.
23 
                                                 
22 Random differences in weather patterns, in demand patterns by domestic residents, or in technology (assuming 
incomplete information flows across borders), would all generate such idiosyncratic risk patterns.  Adler and Dumas
(1983) in fact document a very low correlation in equity returns across countries.
23 See Gordon and Varian (1989), Werner (1994), Huizinga and Nielsen (1997), and Gordon and Gaspar (2001) for 
alternative derivations of the optimal tax policies in this setting.   21
This intervention might take the form of corporate taxes on the return to domestic capital 
supplemented by an additional withholding tax on dividends and capital gains paid to foreign 
owners.
24  Hines and Willard (1992) document that, while many countries impose significant 
withholding taxes on dividend payments to foreign owners, it is much less common to impose large 
withholding taxes on interest payments. This is as would be expected if countries have little ability 
to affect the net-of-tax interest rate paid on “risk-free” assets.
25 With this explanation for 
withholding taxes, it is no longer surprising that countries change them very little in response to 
changes in net capital flows.   
As with other uses of tariffs, the gains to country n from imposing withholding taxes come 
at the expense of investors from other countries, who earn lower rates of return on their investments 
in country n's securities.  These losses to nonresidents would not be considered by the government 
of country n in setting its policies, implying that the policies chosen in equilibrium by each 
government will not be Pareto optimal from the perspective of the governments jointly.  As a result, 
there would potentially be a mutual gain from agreements to reduce tariffs.
26  In fact, bilateral 
treaties to reduce withholding taxes on cross-border financial payments are common, as 
documented by Hines and Willard (1992). 
 
3.3.   Time inconsistency of the optimal tax system 
Another important aspect of simple models of optimal tax policy is that individuals own no 
assets initially, thereby removing the possibility of implementing a nondistorting (lump-sum) tax 
on initial asset holdings.  If individuals do own assets at the time tax policy is being determined, 
                                                 
24 See Gordon and Gaspar (2001) for a formal derivation.
25 Huizinga (1996) offers evidence that higher withholding taxes raise pretax interest rates, but that the availability of 
foreign tax credits offered by creditor countries mitigates this effect.   22
then the model implies that one component of the optimal tax policy will be to seize any initial 
assets, since such actions raise revenue without distorting future decisions.  Not only does this 
seizure have no efficiency cost, but it may also be attractive on distributional grounds to the extent 
that the owners are rich or foreign.
27  While such lump-sum taxes are seldom observed, unexpected 
taxes on capital investments also raise revenue from the initial owners of assets, so can serve much 
the same purpose.
28  
These policies would not be time-consistent, however.  The optimal policy involves no such 
seizure of assets in later periods, yet the government will have an incentive according to the model 
to impose such a “lump-sum” tax in the future whenever it reconsiders its tax policy.  Investors 
might then rationally anticipate these seizures in the future, thereby discouraging investment and 
introducing distortions that optimal tax policies would otherwise avoid. 
As a result, governments have incentives ex ante to constrain themselves not to use such 
time-inconsistent policies in the future.  Laws can be enacted, for example, providing full 
compensation in the event of an explicit expropriation.  Existing assets can also be seized 
indirectly, however, by unexpected tax increases, assuming investments already in place have 
become irreversible.  Given the inevitable uncertainties about future revenue needs, a commitment 
never to raise taxes in the future would not be credible.  At best, governments can attempt to 
develop reputations for not imposing windfall losses on existing owners of assets by grandfathering 
existing assets from unexpected tax increases. 
                                                                                                                                                                 
26 As always, if countries are sufficiently asymmetric, then side payments may be needed to assure that each 
government gains from these mutual tariff reductions. 
27 As emphasized by Huizinga  and Nielsen (1997), the government will be more inclined to seize assets owned by 
foreigners, since their welfare is of no consequence to the government.  Faced with this threat, however, firms have 
incentives to reduce the share of their assets held by foreigners, a point emphasized in Olsen and Osmundsen (2001). 
28 In fact, a commitment to using distorting rather than lump-sum taxes may provide a means for the government to 
promise credibly not to impose too high a tax rate ex post, due to the resulting efficiency costs.   23
This problem of time inconsistency is present even in a closed economy.  The incentive to 
renege on any implicit commitment is much stronger, however, when foreigners own domestic 
assets.  If foreign investors can impose a large enough penalty ex post on any government that 
seizes foreign-owned assets (directly or indirectly), then a government would not find it attractive 
to seize these assets and the time consistency problem disappears.
29  Governments would therefore 
find it in their interests to make it easier for foreign investors to impose such penalties.  By 
maintaining financial deposits abroad that can be seized in retaliation for any domestic 
expropriations, for example, governments can implicitly precommit not to expropriate foreign-
owned assets, though at the cost of making these financial deposits vulnerable to seizure by the 
foreign government.  These approaches are unlikely to be effective against unexpected increases in 
tax rates, however. 
How can a government induce foreign investment in the country, given this difficulty of 
making a credible commitment not to raise taxes on these investments in the future?  If foreign 
investors expect the government to impose an extra amount T in taxes in the future due to these 
time consistency problems, then one approach the government might take initially is to offer 
investors a subsidy of T if they agree to invest in the country.
30  Alternatively, governments might 
offer new foreign investors a tax holiday for a given number of years, yet still provide them 
government services during this period.  Since firms commonly run tax losses during their first few 
years of business, however, given the large deductions they receive initially for their start-up 
investments, Mintz (1990) shows that such tax holidays may not in fact be very effective at 
overcoming the time consistency problem.    
 
                                                 
29 See Eaton and Gersovitz (1981) for an exploration of the form such penalties can take.   24
3.4. Fiscal  externalities 
As tax systems deviate from the pure residence-based structure predicted by the simple 
theory, the result that the Nash equilibrium in tax policies generates no fiscal externalities is lost.  
In general, changes in tax policy in any one country can affect welfare in other countries, effects 
that would be ignored in setting tax policies independently.  In particular, when a single country 
raises its tax rate, individuals have incentives to reallocate taxable income into other jurisdictions, 
providing positive externalities to these other jurisdictions.  Conversely, when countries use taxes 
to exploit their power in international markets, or to seize foreign assets irreversibly invested in the 
local economy, then they impose negative externalities on investors in other countries.  Given these 
externalities, there is potential for mutual gains from coordinating tax policies. 
In order to illustrate these effects, assume that the economies in other countries have the 
same general structure as the domestic economy analyzed in section 2.  In particular, the utility of 
each foreign individual equals 
*** * * * * * * (,, , ( 1 ) ) ( ) i nn i vp sp s r w t V G ++ − + , where the superscript “*” 
denotes “foreign.”  The foreign government’s budget constraint implies that 
** ** ** ** * * *
gn n p GK s Q s Q t w L τ =+++ , in which Q
* and Qn
* respectively denote consumption of 
tradables and nontradables by consumers in the foreign country.  If the domestic country raises its 
tax rate τ, then capital leaves and is invested elsewhere.
31  This can affect welfare abroad for a 
variety of reasons.  To begin with, if the remaining capital invested in the domestic economy is 
“sunk,” then existing capital owners now earn lower after-tax returns, at least until the capital stock 
depreciates to the new equilibrium level.  To the extent this capital was owned by foreign investors, 
they suffer windfall losses on their savings.   
                                                                                                                                                                 
30 Doyle and Wijnbergen (1994), for example, note that the government can contribute T towards the initial costs of the 
investment.
31 Note that total savings would remain unchanged, as long as the interest rate is unaffected.     25
In addition, the increase in τ causes K to fall.  Since total savings should remain unaffected, 
assuming no nonnegligible changes in r
*, capital simply shifts abroad, raising K
*.   The extra capital 
raises welfare abroad first due to the extra resulting tax revenue, τ
*∆K
*.  In addition, this extra 
investment will tend to raise the wage rates in these foreign countries, and slightly lower the world 
interest rate.  These price changes will be attractive to many governments on distributional grounds, 
and would normally induce people to work more, generating an efficiency gain due to the tax 
revenue on the extra earnings.
32 
Changes in rates of capital income taxation therefore create a variety of externalities on 
foreigners, some negative but most positive.  If on net these externalities are positive, then the Nash 
equilibrium choices for τ will be too low from an international perspective, and conversely.  In spite 
of the potential gains from tax coordination it does not then follow that tax harmonization 
measures, even if wisely implemented, necessarily will be welfare-enhancing for all participating 
countries.  Differences between country sizes (as analyzed by Bucovetsky, 1991, and Wilson, 
1991), to say nothing of differences in consumer preferences or other endowments, create 
heterogeneous welfare effects of tax harmonization when individual countries can affect world 
prices.  This is evident by comparing the implications of equation (3.1) for countries of differing 
sizes, in a setting in which the world capital market guarantees that  m dK dr*  is the same for all 
countries.  The direction in which a country prefers the world interest rate, and therefore capital tax 
rates, to move then depends critically on its level of Km, which must differ between countries unless 
none are capital importers. 
Of course, taxes other than those on capital income are capable of generating fiscal 
externalities.  Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991) note that international capital mobility implies that 
                                                 
32 See Gordon (1983) for a more complete tabulation of the many forms that these cross-border externalities can take,   26
similar fiscal externalities appear with wage taxation.  In their model of tax competition between 
symmetric countries with wage and capital tax instruments, governments set inefficiently low wage 
tax rates because they ignore their impact on other countries.  Higher wage tax rates generally 
reduce labor supply (if aggregate labor supply is an increasing function of after-tax wages), 
increasing the pretax cost of labor and causing capital outflow.  This process stimulates greater 
labor demand in capital-importing countries, thereby enhancing efficiency to the extent that foreign 
countries also tax labor income. 
A second type of fiscal externality appears with indirect taxation.  For example, when 
value-added tax (VAT) rates vary by country, and are imposed on an origin basis, then consumers 
have incentives to travel in order to buy goods in countries with low VAT rates.  While 
transportation costs have limited the volume of cross-border shopping in the past, cross-border 
shopping is likely to become far more important in the future with the growth of mail-order houses 
and more recently of internet sales.  When goods physically cross borders, governments have at 
least the potential to impose a VAT at the border, preventing evasion.  Monitoring at the border is 
costly, however, which is why it has been abandoned within the European Union.  When goods do 
not physically cross borders, e.g. when information is transferred electronically over the internet or 
when financial services create no detectable cross-border transfer of funds, then consumers can 
easily take advantage of differences in VAT rates across countries.  A reduced VAT rate in one 
country then imposes fiscal externalities on other countries.  As a consequence, there is the 
potential for welfare-improving agreements between countries to coordinate VAT rates.
33 
Differences in the timing of income taxes and value-added taxes can also generate fiscal 
externalities through migration.  Individuals have incentives to work in countries with low tax rates 
                                                                                                                                                                 
and Wilson (1999) for a useful survey of tax competition models.   
33 See, for example, Mintz and Tulkens (1986), Trandel (1992), and Kanbur and Keen (1993).   27
on labor income, but to retire to countries with low VAT rates.  Differences in capital gains tax 
rates also create incentives for individuals to move before selling assets with large accumulated 
capital gains.  The quality of publicly-provided schools, hospitals, and safety-net programs can 
differ substantially across countries, inviting migration in anticipation of heavy use of these 
government services.  Use of debt finance invites inmigration when debt issues substitute for taxes, 
but outmigration when the debt is repaid. 
While multilateral agreements to coordinate tariff policies are common, there have been few 
such attempts to coordinate tax policies across countries.  Giovannini and Hines (1991) point out 
the gains from coordinating income tax policies within the European Union.  They observe that one 
way to enforce residence-based tax rates on capital income within Europe is to impose equal 
source-based taxes on capital income at the highest European rate, permitting capital owners to 
claim rebates for any differences between the European tax rate and those imposed by their home 
governments.  Enforcement costs fall as a result, since it is far easier to monitor the return to capital 
physically located in the country than to monitor the income accruing internationally to each 
domestic resident.  However, such source-based taxes can be maintained in equilibrium, according 
to the models, only if the governments explicitly coordinate among themselves, since each 
government in isolation has an incentive to eliminate its source-based tax.
34   In spite of much 
discussion, there have been no such agreements within the European Union.Countries do 
commonly have bilateral tax treaties that set withholding tax rates on payments of dividends, 
interest, and capital gains between signatories.  The agreements on withholding tax rates almost 
always involve reductions in these rates, however, suggesting that negative externalities, e.g. 
through exercise of market power, outweigh any positive externalities generated by tax   28
competition.
35  In addition, these treaties deal only with withholding tax rates, whereas domestic 
personal and corporate income taxes can also generate tax spillovers to other countries. 
  Another source of coordination is the OECD convention that member countries adopt some 
mechanism to avoid the double-taxation of foreign-source income, either through a crediting 
arrangement or through exempting foreign-source income.  Either arrangement is contrary to the 
forecast from the initial theory that countries would seek to impose residence-based taxes, so the 
OECD requirement does help to explain the existence of crediting and exemption arrangements for 
foreign-source income.  Under an exemption system, however, corporate taxes are precisely 
source-based so that the Nash equilibrium set of tax rates is zero in small open economies. 
Therefore, this convention does not serve to internalize tax spillovers. 
    Under the crediting system, there is not even a Nash equilibrium set of tax policies with 
trade in capital.
36  Gordon (1992) points out, however, that the crediting system might make sense 
if the capital exporters coordinate and act as a Stackelberg leader.  Given this crediting system, 
capital-importing countries will have incentives to match the tax rate chosen by the capital 
exporters.  In particular, under such a tax credit system, the net-of-tax income accruing to a foreign 
subsidiary in some country c equals
37  () [] () [] h c c c h c c τ τ π τ τ τ π , max 1 0 , max 1 − = − − − , where πc 
equals the pretax taxable income of the subsidiary, τc is the tax rate in the host country, and τh is the 
tax rate in the home country offering a tax credit.  As long as  h c τ τ ≤ , any increase in τc leaves 
                                                                                                                                                                 
34 The mechanism described by Giovannini and Hines might require intercountry resource transfers if there are uneven 
capital flows within Europe.  See Gammie (1992) for a more recent detailed examination of the options for 
coordination of corporate tax structures within the European Union. 
35 The link between reductions in withholding tax rates and information-sharing agreements also suggests that countries 
may reduce their withholding tax rate simply because they no longer need such a high tax rate to prevent domestic 
investors from shifting their assets offshore. 
36 See, e.g. Bond and Samuelson (1989) or Gordon (1992) for further discussion. 
37  Under existing crediting schemes, firms can receive credits for any foreign taxes paid up to the amount of  domestic 
taxes due on foreign income.  When foreign tax payments exceed domestic tax liabilities on this income, the firm has 
“excess foreign tax credits,” since it has potential credits it cannot use.  If instead the firm owes residual domestic taxes 
on foreign income, then it has what is known as “deficit foreign tax credits.”     29
firms unaffected yet collects additional revenue for the host country; therefore, the host country has 
an incentive to raise τc up to τh.
38    
Knowing this response of any host government, capital-exporters can induce tax rates to rise 
point for point in host countries when they increase their own domestic tax rates.   As a result, 
domestic residents would face the same tax increase abroad that they face at home when the home 
country raises its tax rate, so can no longer avoid the tax by shifting operations abroad.  From the 
perspective of the firm, the tax has become a residence-based tax.
39  Gordon (1992) shows that use 
of this tax credit may be attractive to the capital-exporting country, even without OECD 
requirements, if investors can otherwise avoid a residence-based tax at some cost.  Without such a 
tax-crediting scheme, equilibrium capital income tax rates instead equal zero.   
Under this argument, however, capital exporters are attempting to induce capital-importing 
countries to raise their tax rates on capital imports so as to discourage capital flight.  This is 
contrary to the observation in tax treaties that governments attempt to reduce the taxes host 
governments impose on capital imports.  In addition, all countries except New Zealand that offer a 
credit against their domestic taxes for foreign tax payments allow multinationals to defer their 
domestic tax liabilities until profits are repatriated.  With deferral, host countries still have 
incentives to impose withholding taxes on dividend repatriations to parent firms.  Corporate taxes, 
however, are now dominated by withholding taxes.
40  Furthermore, many countries allow firms to 
pool their repatriations from abroad, so that excess foreign tax credits from one country can offset 
domestic taxes otherwise owed on repatriations from other countries.  Firms can then arrange their 
investments and repatriations so that no taxes are due in the home country on foreign operations.  If 
                                                 
38 By prior arguments, it would not want to raise τc further, since doing so is simply a source-based tax on capital. 
39 From the perspective of the governments, however, the outcome is not equivalent to a residence--based tax, since the 
tax payments made by domestic residents on their investments abroad go to the foreign rather than the domestic 
government.   30
no domestic taxes are due, then any taxes paid abroad become source-based taxes, which remain 
unattractive.    
  Given the availability of both worldwide averaging and deferral of tax until repatriation, it 
is difficult to argue that tax-crediting arrangements have much effect on equilibrium corporate tax 
rates in host countries.  Therefore, there is no plausible theoretical expectation as well as no direct 
evidence of coordination of tax policies.    
 
4.  Taxes and Portfolio Capital Flows 
  This section considers the effect of taxation on the demand and supply of international 
portfolio capital flows.  Such capital flows are characterized by the absence of mutual controlling 
interest between transacting parties, so that they might take the form of bank loans to unrelated 
firms, or individual purchases of shares of stock in foreign companies.  Most international capital 
movements take the form of portfolio capital flows, and while there are features of portfolio capital 
flows that carry standard implications for international tax policies, there are also some observed 
aspects that are difficult to reconcile with standard theories. 
 
4.1.  Uniform income taxation 
  The most analytically straightforward type of international capital flow is that involving 
debt contracts between unrelated parties, since simple capital market arbitrage implies that 
investors must face identical risk-adjusted after-tax real interest rates for all transactions.  
International borrowing and lending entail at least two important complications that distinguish 
them from purely domestic transactions.  The first is that borrowers and lenders experience gains or 
losses resulting from movements in the relative values of foreign and domestic currencies.  The tax 
                                                                                                                                                                 
40 A corporate tax now discourages investment because the credit is delayed in time, and therefore of less value.  31
treatment of these gains and losses then affects the desirability of borrowing and lending in 
currencies in which exchange gains and losses are possible.  The second complication is that 
governments may impose withholding taxes on cross-border payments of interest.  These issues are 
considered in turn. 
  Interest rates in international capital markets adjust in reaction to anticipated nominal price 
changes, though the extent of this adjustment is affected by the tax regime.  This point is illustrated 
most clearly in the case of a small open economy. The expected after-tax net return to foreign 
lenders( ) rnw ,  loaning money to a borrower in the small open economy is: 
( 4 . 1 )       rr g e nw ,
** * () () & =− + − 11 θ  
in which θ
*is the foreign tax rate on interest receipts from abroad (inclusive of any withholding 
taxes), r is the home (small) country nominal interest rate,  g
*is the foreign tax rate on exchange 
rate-related gains and losses, and  &
* e is the anticipated appreciation (in foreign currency) of 
domestic assets held by foreign lenders.  We assume exchange rates to be determined by 
purchasing power parity (PPP) in the goods market, which implies  &
** e =− ππ  (in whichπ
*is the 
foreign inflation rate, and π is the domestic inflation rate).
41  A small open economy must offer 
foreign lenders an after-tax rate of return equal to returns available elsewhere.
42  Consequently, 





= 0, and differentiating (4.1) with respect toπ implies:  
                                                 
41 While this assumption is fairly standard, it is important to note that the literature suggests that PPP is best understood 
as a long-run phenomenon.  See, for example, Parsley and Wei (1996), and Froot, Kim and Rogoff (1995). 
42  Strictly speaking, capital market equilibrium requires that risk-adjusted after-tax returns must be equalized.  In the 
certainty framework used here, risk considerations are absent and capital market equilibrium requires only that after-tax 
returns be equalized.  For an explicit consideration of the implications of risk for the analysis, see for example Gordon 
and Varian (1989).   32



















= 0.  If foreign tax systems treat exchange rate-related gains and 





= 1, consistent with much of 
the empirical work on the relationship between interest rates and inflation.
44   
While this change in r in response to an increase in inflation leaves foreign investors 
unaffected, the rate of return available to domestic investors falls.  In particular, domestic investors 
receive real returns of  () () ( ) π π π θ − − − + − * 1 1 g r  on their investments in bonds from any given 
country (including their own).  An increase in the domestic inflation rate, π, then reduces the after-
tax return on all bonds, both domestic and foreign, as viewed from the standpoint of domestic 
lenders.  The reason is that lenders must pay taxes on the purely nominal component of their 







, then (taking  θ = g ), lenders would experience no change in their after-tax real 
returns; this is the basis of Feldstein’s (1976) argument that nominal interest rates should rise more 
than one-for-one with inflation in closed economies. 
                                                 
43 In practice, the capital exporting countries whose tax systems are described by Commission of the European 
Communities (1992, pp. 235-303) generally set  g
** = θ .  For the issues that arise when these tax rates differ, see Levi 
(1977) and Wahl (1989). 
 
44  Unless  g = θ  in all countries, however, then r cannot respond to changes in π in a way that leaves all investors 
indifferent, a point emphasized by Slemrod (1988).  In this case, without some addition to the model, e.g. short-sales 
constraints as in Gordon (1986) or risk considerations as in Gordon and Varian (1989), there will no longer be an 
equilibrium.     33
What distinguishes foreign and domestic investors is that foreign lenders are able to deduct 
against their taxable incomes any foreign exchange losses (or reduced foreign exchange gains) 
created by domestic inflation, while domestic savers are unable to deduct the real losses they incur 
as a result of domestic inflation.  Perfect indexation of domestic tax systems would of course 
eliminate this difference, but in practice, most countries do not provide such indexation.  Foreign 
exchange gains are taxable, and foreign exchange losses are deductible, simply by virtue of the 
convention of measuring taxable income in units of home currencies. 
  This tax treatment of exchange rate gains and losses then also influences the effect of 
inflation on the demand for capital investment in domestic economies.  Tax systems that are not 
perfectly indexed permit inflation to affect investment incentives through the use of historic cost 
depreciation and inventory valuation, the taxation of nominal capital gains, and the ability to deduct 
nominal interest payments.
45   While all of these considerations appear in closed economies, what 
makes the open economy different is the attenuated reaction of nominal interest rates to changes in 
inflation.  Since nominal interest rates react only one-for-one to changes in inflation, the real after-
tax interest rate falls as inflation rises.  Then to the extent that debt finance is used at the margin, 
and more generally that investment is affected by the cost of capital, domestic investment should 
rise in reaction to a reduced cost of borrowing.
46  The net effect of inflation on capital demand then 
depends on the relative importance of this consideration and others including the nonindexation of 
depreciation deductions.
47 
                                                 
45 See Feldstein (1980).  Auerbach and Hines (1988) note, however, that over the postwar period, U.S. depreciation 
schedules appear to have been informally indexed by regular legislative adjustments to compensate for inflation. 
46 See Hartman (1979) for a development of this argument.  For evidence of the responsiveness of saving and 
investment to the after-tax cost of capital, see the chapters by Bernheim  and by Hassett and Hubbard in volume three 
of this Handbook. 
47 Gordon (1982) attempts to measure the sizes of these terms, finding that the reduced value of depreciation 
allowances is likely to be more than offset by the induced decline in the real cost of debt and equity finance.  Desai and   34
  The preceding analysis ignores the impact of withholding taxes on cross-border interest 
payments.  In practice, many governments impose such taxes, which might take the form of 
requiring domestic borrowers to withhold a tax equal to 5 percent of any interest paid to foreign 
lenders.  These withholding taxes are formally the obligation of those receiving interest payments, 
so lenders can claim foreign tax credits for withholding taxes.  But since some lenders are ineligible 
to claim foreign tax credits (because their home governments do not permit them), and others are 
unable to take full advantage of additional foreign tax credits (due to tax losses, excess foreign tax 
limits, or a decision not to report the income), it follows that at least some fraction of withholding 
tax liabilities are borne by lenders and should therefore be reflected in higher nominal interest rates.  
Huizinga (1996) offers evidence that pre-tax borrowing rates are increasing functions of local 
withholding tax rates, though there is some indication that the potential creditability of withholding 
taxes mitigates this effect.  Papke (2000) reports volumes of loans from foreigners to American 
borrowers are negatively affected by withholding tax rates on interest payments from the United 
States. 
It is possible to broaden this analysis to consider the effect of taxation on individual 
portfolios containing differentiated assets.  The starting point in thinking about taxes and portfolio 
choice is the observation that taxes have no effect on equilibrium portfolios if all countries impose 
residence-based taxes on income from savings at the same rate for all forms of savings, even 
though these rates are not identical across countries.   To see this, assume there are I possible 
assets, where any asset i yields a before-tax real returns of ri.  Assume that each country k imposes 
a uniform residence-based income tax at rate mk.  Then in equilibrium investors are indifferent 
among all the different assets if and only if they yield the same risk-adjusted after-tax return: 
                                                                                                                                                                 
Hines (1999b) analyze the magnitude of the welfare costs of inflation-associated saving and investment distortions,   35
 
(4.3)      () () k j i m r m r k j k i , , 1 1 ∀ − = −  
In equilibrium, it must be that  j i r r j i , ∀ = , and there are no tax distortions to portfolio choice.   
4.2. Nonuniform  income  taxation 
  In practice, tax rates on investment income commonly differ by type of asset, with rules 
differing by country.  For example, relative tax rates on interest, dividends, and capital gains differ 
by country; and the returns to certain assets are tax-exempt in some countries but not in others.  
Denote the tax rate on the return to asset i in country k by mik.  Then investors from that country are 
indifferent between holding any two assets i and j if and only if ri(1-mik)=rj(1-mjk).  As emphasized 
by Slemrod (1988), this equality can hold simultaneously for investors from different countries for 
only a very restrictive set of relative tax rates, yet actual tax structures are much more variable.   
Equilibrium portfolios are therefore distorted, given existing tax structures.  In fact, without some 
additional factors limiting portfolio choice (such as restrictions on short sales) there is no 
equilibrium.  It is therefore important to consider the implications of nonuniform taxation of asset 
income, and the factors that might reconcile them with observed portfolios. 
  The preceding analysis of the effect of inflation takes foreign exchange gains and losses to 
be taxed at the same rates as ordinary income.  As emphasized by Gordon (1986), additional 
portfolio distortions are introduced if capital gains and losses resulting from changes in exchange 
rates are not taxed at accrual – as is, for example, characteristic of equity investments that generate 
unrealized capital gains, or when tax systems fail to implement appropriate discount rules for long-
term bonds.  In particular, bonds issued in countries with a high inflation rate might need to pay a 
                                                                                                                                                                 
finding that the welfare costs of inflation in open economies have the potential greatly to exceed the costs of inflation in   36
high nominal interest rate to compensate for the capital loss that investors experience due to the 
inflation.  When the required addition to the nominal interest rate is taxed at a higher rate than 
applies to the associated capital loss due to inflation, the size of the increase in the interest rate 
needed to compensate for inflation will be higher the higher the tax rate of the investor.  As a result, 
these bonds will be purchased primarily by investors facing low tax rates.  If exchange rates were 
riskless, then a costless form of tax arbitrage becomes feasible, with investors in high tax brackets 
borrowing in countries with a high inflation rate and investing in bonds from countries with a low 
inflation rate, and conversely for investors in low tax brackets. 
When different types of assets face different tax rates, their pretax rates of return will adjust 
in equilibrium to compensate for the differences in tax treatment, so that heavily taxed assets offer 
the highest pretax rates of return.  This observation has interesting implications for tax policy.  For 
a country raising capital from abroad, the pretax rate of return it has to pay to foreign investors will 
be higher if the financial asset used will face higher domestic tax rates in the investors’ home 
countries.  By this argument, bond finance should be more expensive than equity finance, at least 
after controlling for risk.  However, when interest but not dividend payments are deductible under 
the corporate tax, firms may prefer debt to equity finance – due to the deductibility of interest 
payments, debt finance can be cheaper to the firm even when it is more expensive for the country 
as a whole.  The government absorbs the extra costs through the fall in tax revenue, and so has a 
strong incentive to reduce or eliminate the tax advantage to debt finance.
48  Similarly, when 
domestic investors have a tax incentive to buy equity or other more lightly taxed assets, the pretax 
return they earn is reduced, which again would be reflected in a fall in government tax revenue.  
                                                                                                                                                                 
closed economies. 
48 For further discussion, see Gordon (1986).   37
This pressure towards equal tax treatment of different type of assets is an example of the gains from 
productive efficiency described in Diamond and Mirrlees (1971). 
4.3. Home  bias 
  The standard approach in the finance literature to explain portfolio choice is to assume that 
investors are risk averse and that the returns to different assets are risky, with the return on each 
asset having at least some idiosyncratic elements.  Without taxes, standard portfolio models 
forecast full diversification of portfolios worldwide.   The difficulty is that this forecast is clearly 
counterfactual, since the data show that a large fraction of the equity and debt issued in any country 
is held directly by residents of that country.  This phenomenon is known as “home bias,”
49 and its 
source is not entirely understood.  One possibility is that tax systems may be responsible for at least 
part of observed “home bias.” 
Introducing taxes into a standard portfolio model generates the prediction that investors will 
tend to specialize in those securities where they face relatively favorable tax treatment compared 
with other investors.  For example, if investors in country k face a tax rate mk on income from 
bonds and a rate α mk on income from equity, with α<1, where for simplicity α does not vary across 
countries, then the fraction of portfolios held in equity should be an increasing function of mk.  This 
model implies that the portfolios of American investors should contain smaller fractions of equity 
following the U.S. personal tax rate reduction in 1986.
50  As documented by Scholes et al (2002), 
foreign investors (primarily foreign multinational firms) increased their equity investments in 
American firms after 1986, which is consistent with the forecast of this model.   
  Taxes have the potential to affect portfolio choices, and some of the forecasted effects 
appear in the data.  However, the above forecasts with taxes still do not explain the observed 
                                                 
49 See Adler and Dumas (1983) and French and Poterba (1991) for evidence.   38
specialization in portfolios, suggesting important omissions from this model.  One important 
omission is the possibility of tax evasion on income from foreign securities through use of foreign 
financial intermediaries.  This potential ease of evading personal income taxes on portfolio income 
through use of foreign financial intermediaries has strongly influenced some of the discussion of 
equilibrium tax policy in the theoretical literature.  If “capital flight” were an important empirical 
phenomenon, then a large fraction of the funds invested in the United States should appear to be 
coming from “nonresidents,” as residents try to disguise themselves as nonresidents in order to 
avoid domestic taxes.  Consistent with this forecast, an unusually large volume of funds enters the 
United States from Switzerland, the Netherlands Antilles, and other tax havens.  The same process, 
however, implies that domestic investors will appear to be foreign in the data, so that observed 
portfolios should have a “foreign-bias” rather than a “home-bias,” which is inconsistent with 
reported patterns.   
  There are at least some elements of the tax law that result in higher effective tax rates on 
holdings of foreign equity.  For example, countries commonly impose withholding taxes on 
dividends and capital gains received by foreign investors.  While many investors receive credits for 
these withholding taxes against their domestic income tax liabilities, this is not true for all 
investors.
51  Those investors whose tax liabilities are increased by withholding taxes would in 
response reduce their equity investments.
52  
In addition, many countries have dividend imputation schemes.   Under a dividend 
imputation scheme, when a domestic shareholder in country j receives a dividend d from a 
                                                                                                                                                                 
50 The tax change in fact raised α by increasing the relative tax rate on capital gains, reinforcing this forecast. 
51 Since the foreign tax credit is limited to domestic tax liabilities, investors in low tax brackets are unable to take full 
advantage of them.  Foreign tax credits are of least value to tax-exempt investors such as pension funds, though some 
tax treaties do exempt foreign pension funds from withholding tax liabilities. 
52 When countries have market power in world equity markets, then the intent of these withholding taxes may well have 
been to reduce foreign holdings of domestic equity.  39
domestic firm, he owes personal taxes of  ( ) () c c j m d τ τ − − 1 /  on this income, where τc is the 
domestic corporate income tax rate.
53  In contrast, when the investor receives a dividend d from a 
foreign firm, he owes personal taxes of dmj.
54  Therefore, the scheme gives domestic investors a 
powerful incentive to favor domestic equity.
55  Foreign investors, in contrast, normally do not 
qualify for the rebate of corporate taxes under the dividend imputation scheme.
56 
Under these dividend imputation schemes, however, individual investors could simply shift 
to investing abroad through domestic multinational companies.  The investor would then 
potentially qualify for the dividend imputation scheme on the dividends paid by the domestic parent 
firm regardless of whether the underlying income was earned at home or abroad.
57  As a result, 
domestic taxes would no longer distort the international composition of portfolios, though in many 
countries they strongly favor multinational investments over portfolio investments. 
  While these tax distortions may explain some part of the observed portfolio specialization, 
they are far too small to rationalize the substantial specialization in portfolios observed in the 
data.
58  As a result, a large literature has developed exploring a variety of possible explanations for 
                                                 
53 The intent of these schemes is to tax the pre-corporate-tax income at the personal tax rate mj.  In particular, a local 
firm needs to earn d/(1-τc) before corporate taxes on its local investments to finance this dividend.  While it pays 
/(1 ) cc d τ τ −  in corporate taxes on this income, the shareholder receives this amount as a rebate, so on net he faces an 
effective tax rate of mj on the underlying corporate income.
54 This assumes that investors do not evade domestic taxes on the dividends they receive from foreign firms.  If taxes 
on foreign but not domestic dividends are evaded, then the dividend imputation scheme provides an incentive to 
specialize in domestic equity only if mj < τc. 
55 See Boadway and Bruce (1992) for further discussion. 
56 The U.K. is one exception, allowing foreign investors to receive the same rebate of U.K. corporate taxes. 
57 In an attempt to restrict the rebate to domestic-source income, dividends are commonly eligible for the dividend 
imputation scheme only to the extent that they are less than reported domestic-source income, requiring that 
() df d d ππ π +≤ , where d is the dividend payout rate and where  ) ( f d π π  equals domestic-source (foreign-source) 
income. This constraint therefore requires that  () / ddf d πππ <+ .  Given typical dividend payout rates, this constraint 
is likely to bind for only a few highly international companies.  (Hines (1996b) notes, though, that payout rates seem to 
be higher on foreign-source income.)   
58 See French and Poterba (1991), for example, for an attempt to calculate the size of the relative advantage to domestic 
equity needed to rationalize observed behavior.   40
the observed “home bias” in portfolios.
59  The question from a tax perspective is the implications of 
the resulting home bias for both positive and normative models of taxes on income from capital.   
  A natural inference from observed home bias is that aggregate demand for domestic equity 
is much less elastic than would be implied by standard models of portfolio choice.  As a result, the 
incidence of a tax on the return to domestic equity falls more heavily on the owners of this equity 
(both foreign and domestic) than would be true in standard portfolio choice models that forecast 
more balanced portfolios.  This less elastic behavior then may help explain the substantial tax rates 
that apply to income from domestic capital, in spite of the forecasts from simpler models that there 
should be no “source-based” taxes on capital. 
  Surprisingly, perhaps, the attempts to date to confirm this intuition by reexamining optimal 
tax rates in an explicit model potentially capable of rationalizing specialized portfolios do not 
support this intuition.  Gordon and Bovenberg (1996), for example, analyze tax policy in a model in 
which specialized portfolios result from asymmetric information across investors from different 
countries – investors are assumed to be much better informed about domestic securities than about 
foreign securities, so may overpay for foreign securities.  In this model, the resulting “lemons” 
problem leads to too little trade in equity.  Domestic owners of equity gain at the margin from 
greater foreign demand, since it consists of more poorly informed customers that potentially can be 
overcharged.  In a small open economy, however, it is still true that the incidence of any subsidies 
or taxes on income from domestic capital falls entirely on domestic residents.  As a result, the 
government in a small open economy has an incentive to subsidize foreign purchases of domestic 
                                                 
59 For example, French and Poterba (1991) and Tesar and Werner (1994) both conclude that higher transactions costs 
on investments abroad cannot be the explanation.  Eldor et al (1988) hypothesize that domestic equity helps hedge 
against risks in labor income; Hartley (1986) suggests that it may hedge against risks from nontraded assets; while 
Gordon and Gaspar (2001) focus on a hedging role against random consumer prices.  Bottazzi et al (1996) provide 
some empirical support for the first such hedging role, while Pesenti and Wincoop (forthcoming) provide evidence 
against the second such hedging role.  41
equity until the resulting gains to domestic owners are just offset by the costs of the marginal 
subsidy.  Rather than leading to positive tax rates on domestic capital, this model forecasts 
subsidies at least to foreign purchasers of domestic capital. 
  Gordon and Gaspar (2001) analyze optimal tax policy under the alternative assumption that 
investors specialize in domestic equity because it offers a hedge against uncertainty in the price of 
domestic consumer goods.  Their results suggest that introducing this hedging role for domestic 
equity lowers rather than raises the optimal tax rates on domestic capital.  An important reason is 
that hedging lowers the fraction of domestic shares owned by foreigners, thereby reducing the 
extent to which any tax burden is shifted abroad. 
  Other possible explanations for observed “home bias” could well have yet different 
implications for optimal tax policy.  In the absence of a compelling explanation for observed “home 
bias,” it is difficult to characterize optimal tax policy even in a small open economy.   
   
 
5.  Taxes and the behavior of multinational firms 
Multinational corporations play a dominant role in international capital flows and 
international trade, so it is essential in analyzing the effects of taxation in an international context to 
focus on their implications for the behavior of multinationals.  In particular, it is useful to consider 
empirical evidence of the effect of taxation on the activities of multinational firms, and the extent to 
which these responses are consistent with theoretical forecasts.  Important differences between 
actual and predicted behavior have the potential to suggest useful modifications to the theory of   42
multinational firms, which in turn may carry implications for optimal tax design.  This section takes 
these issues in turn, first reviewing the evidence, then assessing its theoretical implications.
60 
 
5.1.    Behavioral evidence 
International tax rules and the tax laws of other countries have the potential to influence a 
wide range of corporate and individual behavior, including, most directly, the location and scope of 
international business activity, but also including domestic operations that are connected to foreign 
operations through various international tax provisions.
61  A sizable and growing literature is 
devoted to measuring behavioral responses to international tax rules.  In so doing, this literature 
identifies behavioral patterns that are important to understanding the responses to domestic taxation 
as well.  These patterns include investment behavior as well as various financial and organizational 
practices used to avoid taxes. 
 
5.1.1.   Foreign Direct Investment 
Cross-border investment by controlling entities has acquired a special name, foreign direct 
investment, and an associated acronym, FDI.  What defines such investment is not only that owners 
reside in a different country than the site of investment, but also that ownership is of a controlling 
form, typically defined as 10 percent or more of total ownership in the local investing entity.
62 
                                                 
60 The following section relies heavily on Hines (1997, 1999a). 
61 There are numerous indirect ways in which international taxation affects domestic economies, such as by influencing 
the nature and extent of competition from imports and from foreign multinational firms.  This section follows virtually 
all of the literature in focusing on the direct effects of international tax rules, since indirect effects are extremely 
difficult to identify with available data. 
62 FDI consists of changes in the ownership claims of controlling foreign investors.  For example, an American parent 
firm that establishes a wholly-owned foreign affiliate with $100 million of equity and $50 million of loans from the 
parent company thereby creates $150 million of FDI.  In order for foreign investment to count as FDI, the American 
investor must own at least 10 percent of the foreign affiliate.  FDI is the sum of parent fund transfers and American 
owners’ shares of their foreign affiliates’ reinvested earnings, minus any repatriations to American owners.  Reported 
FDI typically represents book values.   43
Tax policies are obviously capable of affecting the volume and location of FDI, since, all 
other considerations equal, and in the absence of countervailing effects, higher tax rates reduce 
after-tax returns, thereby reducing incentives to commit investment funds.  In practice, FDI is 
affected by commercial and regulatory policies, characteristics of labor markets, the nature of 
competition in product markets, the cost and local availability of intermediate supplies, proximity 
to final markets, and a host of other attributes that influence the desirability of an investment 
location.  The importance of these other considerations suggests to observers such as Markusen 
(1995) that any effect of taxes on FDI will be unnoticeable in practice.  The most reliable FDI 
studies indicate, however, the existence of statistically significant and quantitatively important tax 
effects.  These findings are important not only because they demonstrate the ability of the data to 
identify tax effects against a background of many other variables affecting FDI, but also because 
there are at least two additional reasons why one might anticipate not finding an important 
empirical relationship between taxes and FDI.  The first is that firms may be able to use creative 
financing and other methods so effectively that they costlessly avoid all taxes on their international 
income.  The second is that governments imposing high tax rates may indirectly compensate firms 
with difficult-to-measure investment incentives such as worker training and infrastructure. 
The empirical literature on the effect of taxes on FDI considers almost exclusively U.S. 
data, either the distribution of U.S. direct investment abroad, or the FDI patterns of foreigners who 
invest in the United States.
63  The simple explanation for this focus is not only that the United 
States is the world’s largest economy, but also that the United States collects and distributes much 
more, and higher-quality, data on FDI activities than does any other country. 
The available evidence of the effect of taxation on FDI comes in two forms.  The first is 
time-series estimation of the responsiveness of FDI to annual variation in after-tax rates of return in   44
host countries.
64  Studies of this type consistently report a positive correlation between levels of 
FDI and after-tax rates of return at industry and country levels.
65  The implied elasticity of FDI with 
respect to after-tax returns is generally close to unity, which translates into a tax elasticity of 
investment of roughly -0.6.  The estimated elasticity is similar whether the investment in question 
is American direct investment abroad or FDI by foreigners in the United States. 
Much of this literature is highly aggregate, evaluating, for example, the correlation between 
annual movements in after-tax rates of return earned by FDI in the United States and annual 
changes in FDI flows to the United States.  Aggregate FDI data distinguish investment financed by 
retained earnings of foreign affiliates from FDI financed by transfers of parent funds (debt plus 
equity).  Studies that estimate separate (and independent) equations for these two sources of FDI 
typically find that FDI financed by retained earnings is more strongly influenced by host country 
after-tax rates of return.
66 
It can be difficult to interpret such evidence.  Estimated tax effects in aggregate time-series 
studies are identified by yearly variation in taxes or profitability that may be correlated with 
important omitted variables.  As a result, it is almost impossible to distinguish the effects of 
taxation from the effects of other variables that are correlated with tax rates. 
Two of the time-series studies exploit cross-sectional differences that offer the potential for 
greater explanatory power.  Slemrod (1990) distinguishes FDI in the United States by the tax 
regime in the country of origin.  Investors from countries (of which Slemrod analyzes data for 
                                                                                                                                                                 
63 Devereux and Freeman (1995) and Hines (2001) are recent exceptions. 
64 Implicit in this estimation is a q-style investment model in which contemporaneous average after-tax rates of return 
serve as proxies for returns to marginal FDI.  In theory, these specifications should also control for after-tax rates of 
return available elsewhere, though in practice this is infeasible. 
65 See, for example, Hartman (1984), Boskin and Gale (1987), Newlon (1987), Young (1988), Slemrod (1990), and 
Swenson (1994). 
66 For example, Hartman (1984) reports elasticities with respect to after-tax returns of 1.4 for FDI financed by retained 
earnings and 0.5 for FDI financed by transfers of parent funds.  Similarly, Young (1988) reports elasticities with   45
Japan and the United Kingdom) with tax systems similar to that used by the United States receive 
foreign tax credits for taxes paid to the United States.  Investors from certain other countries (of 
which Slemrod analyzes data for Australia, Canada, France, Germany, and the Netherlands) are 
more or less exempt from home-country taxation of any profits earned in the United States.  
Consequently, investors from France and Germany have stronger incentives to invest in the United 
States during low-tax years than do investors from Japan and the United Kingdom, since Japanese 
and British investors are eligible to claim tax credits for any U.S. taxes they pay.  In his analysis of 
data covering 1962-1987, Slemrod finds no clear empirical pattern indicating that investors from 
countries that exempt U.S. profits from home-country taxation are more sensitive to tax changes 
than are investors from countries granting foreign tax credits.  This evidence suggests either that 
home-country tax regimes do not influence FDI, or that time series variation in tax rates is 
inadequate to identify tax effects that are nonetheless present. 
Swenson (1994) considers the tax determinants of industry-level FDI in the United States 
over the 1979-1991 period.  U.S. tax changes often affect industries to differing degrees, based 
largely on the assets in which they invest; this was particularly true of tax legislation enacted in 
1981 and 1986.  Swenson finds that industries in which the (U.S.) after-tax cost of capital rose the 
most after passage of the U.S. Tax Reform Act of 1986 were those in which foreign investors 
concentrated their FDI in the post-1986 period.  This is consistent with the tax incentives of foreign 
investors from countries granting foreign tax credits, since such investors are the least affected by 
U.S. tax provisions – but it is also possible that foreign investors chose to concentrate in such 
industries for any of a number of non-tax reasons.  Auerbach and Hassett (1993) lend credence to 
the latter interpretation with their finding that investors from countries granting foreign tax credits 
                                                                                                                                                                 
respect to after-tax returns of 1.89 for FDI financed by retained earnings and close to zero for FDI financed by transfers 
of parent funds.  Boskin and Gale (1987) likewise obtain results that are very similar to Hartman’s.   46
were no more likely than were other foreign investors to concentrate their FDI in tax-disadvantaged 
industries after 1986. 
Other studies of investment location are exclusively cross-sectional in nature, exploiting the 
very large differences in corporate tax rates around the world to identify the effects of taxes on FDI.  
Grubert and Mutti (1991) and Hines and Rice (1994) estimate the effect of national tax rates on the 
cross-sectional distribution of aggregate American-owned property, plant and equipment (PPE) in 
1982.  PPE differs from FDI in that PPE represents (the book value of) real productive assets held 
by American-owned affiliates, while FDI equals the annual change in the book value of ownership 
claims of controlling foreign investors.
67  Grubert and Mutti analyze the distribution of PPE in 
manufacturing affiliates in 33 countries, reporting a –0.1 elasticity with respect to local tax rates.  
That is, controlling for other observable determinants of FDI, ten percent differences in local tax 
rates are associated with one percent differences in amounts of local PPE ownership in 1982.  
Hines and Rice consider the distribution of PPE in all affiliates in 73 countries, reporting a much 
larger –1 elasticity of PPE ownership with respect to tax rates.  Altshuler et al. (2001) compare the 
tax sensitivity of PPE ownership in 58 countries in 1984 to that in 1992, reporting estimated tax 
elasticities that rise (in absolute value) from –1.5 in 1984 to –2.8 in 1992.  Hines (2001) compares 
the distribution of Japanese and American FDI around the world, finding Japanese investment to be 
concentrated in countries with which Japan has “tax sparing” agreements that reduce home country 
                                                 
67 The distinction between FDI and PPE ownership of foreign affiliates is perhaps best illustrated by an example.  
Consider two American-controlled foreign affiliates, each with $100 million of assets entirely invested in PPE.  One 
affiliate is 100 percent owned by its American parent, while the other is 60 percent owned by the parent company and 
40 percent owned by investors in its host country.  Both affiliates account for $100 million of PPE.  Establishing the 
first affiliate with $100 million of debt and equity from the parent company represents $100 million of outbound FDI 
from the United States, while establishing the second with parent funds represents $60 million of FDI.  If half of the 
affiliate financing represented funds borrowed from local banks, then establishing the affiliates would represent $50 
million and $30 million of FDI respectively.  To the degree that the affiliates’ assets were not entirely invested in PPE, 
then the PPE figures could change without any corresponding change in FDI.  Of the two measurement concepts, PPE 
corresponds to capital stock notions implicit in most economic models than does the stock of accumulated FDI.   47
taxation of foreign income.  The estimated FDI impact of “tax sparing” is consistent with the tax 
elasticity of PPE reported by Hines and Rice. 
Harris (1993) uses firm-level data to consider the effect of the Tax Reform Act of 1986 on 
direct investment abroad by American companies.  One of the consequences of the 1986 Act was to 
remove many of the benefits previously enjoyed by taxpayers investing in equipment located in the 
United States.  Harris finds that American firms with higher equipment/structures ratios invested 
abroad more heavily after 1986, suggesting that the tax change encouraged them to substitute 
foreign for domestic investment.  This evidence is no more than suggestive, however, since 
unobserved firm characteristics that are correlated with high equipment/structures ratios could also 
be responsible for greater outbound FDI after 1986. 
A number of cross-sectional studies consider the effects of subnational taxes on the 
geographic pattern of FDI within the United States.
68  Foreign investors must pay state corporate 
income taxes, at rates that vary from zero to close to 15 percent.  Coughlin et al. (1991) estimate the 
determinants of new plant location by foreign investors during 1981-1983, reporting insignificant 
effects of local tax rates after controlling for other variables.  Ondrich and Wasylenko (1993) 
analyze a larger sample of new plant establishments over a longer time span (1978-1987), finding 
significant effects of state tax rates on the location of new plants.  Ondrich and Wasylenko fit a 
model of the probability of locating plants in each state; their estimates imply an elasticity of the 
number of new plants with respect to state tax rates equal to –0.6.  Swenson (2001) estimates 
separate regressions for differing types of transactions (such as the establishment of new plants, 
                                                 
68 There is also a small literature analyzing the effects of Puerto Rico’s special tax status.  Prior to legislative changes 
enacted in 1993, mainland American firms were effectively exempt from U.S. corporate tax on profits earned in Puerto 
Rico, though they were subject to Puerto Rican tax.  Bond (1981) identifies significant effects of expiring Puerto Rican 
tax holidays on decisions of mainland firms to exit the garment industry over the 1949-1972 period.  Grubert and 
Slemrod (1998) find that mainland firms with attributes associated with intangible assets – such as high R&D and 
advertising intensities – are the most likely to invest in Puerto Rico.  Grubert and Slemrod note that this pattern may   48
plant expansions, mergers and acquisitions, and joint ventures) undertaken by foreign investors in 
the United States.  The results indicate that tax effects vary with transaction type: high state tax 
rates are negatively correlated with the establishment of new plants and with plant expansions, 
while they are positively correlated with acquisitions by foreign investors. 
One of the difficulties facing all cross-sectional studies of FDI location is the inevitable 
omission of many important determinants of FDI that may be correlated with tax rates and 
therefore bias the estimation of tax elasticities.  This consideration makes it attractive to use 
empirical specifications that include locational fixed effects, but then the question becomes how it 
is possible simultaneously to identify the impact of tax differences on investment. 
Hines (1996a) incorporates state fixed effects in comparing the distributions of FDI within 
the United States of investors whose home governments grant foreign tax credits for federal and 
state income taxes with those whose home governments do not tax income earned in the United 
States.  The inclusion of fixed effects implicitly controls for hard-to-measure state attributes (such 
as those that make Silicon Valley or midtown Manhattan “special”), as long as the effect of these 
attributes does not vary systematically between investors from countries with differing home-
country tax regimes.  Tax effects are identified by comparing, for example, the extent to which 
investments from Germany (which exempts from tax foreign-source income earned in the United 
States) tend to be located in lower-tax states than are investments from the United Kingdom (which 
provides foreign tax credits for state income taxes paid).  The evidence indicates that one percent 
state tax rate differences in 1987 are associated with ten percent differences in amounts of 
manufacturing PPE owned by investors from countries with differing home-country taxation of 
foreign-source income, and three percent differences in numbers of affiliates owned.  Taken as a 
                                                                                                                                                                 
reflect the ability of firms with intangible assets to shift profits into their affiliates in low-tax jurisdictions, thereby 
increasing the attractiveness of locating investment in Puerto Rico.   49
structural relationship, the estimates imply a tax elasticity of investment equal to –0.6.  It is worth 
bearing in mind, however, that this estimate reflects the effect of taxation on the identity of 
ownership of capital as well as on the volume of investment. 
The econometric work of the last fifteen years provides ample evidence of the sensitivity of 
the level and location of FDI to its tax treatment.  Indeed, given the pervasiveness of this finding, 
this research is perhaps too greatly focused on an earlier question – do tax policies influence FDI? – 
and not enough on more subtle variants such as the role of tax policy in affecting the form that FDI 
takes, the possible importance of tax policy credibility and enforcement, and the relationship 
between tax and non-tax determinants of FDI. 
Hines (1991) and Collins and Shackelford (1995) consider more dramatic reactions to high 
tax rates in which firms relocate their corporate homes to countries with more attractive tax 
climates.  They estimate the tax savings available to firms that move from countries (such as the 
United States) with worldwide tax systems to countries that exempt foreign earnings from taxation.  
It is striking that, in spite of the appeal of low tax rates, very few multinational firms actually 
relocate their corporate homes to tax havens.  In part, this reflects the tax and regulatory costs of 
doing so, but in part it also reflects the unwillingness of governments to impose excessively heavy 
tax burdens that encourage widespread departures. 
 
5.1.2  Tax avoidance 
International investors often have at their disposal numerous alternative methods of 
structuring and financing their investments, arranging transactions between related parties located 
in different countries, and returning profits to investors.  These alternatives have important tax   50
implications, and there is considerable evidence that tax considerations strongly influence the 
choices that firms make. 
Sophisticated international tax avoidance typically entails reallocating taxable income from 
countries with high tax rates to countries with low tax rates, and may also include changing the 
timing of income recognition for tax purposes.  Many of these methods are quite legal, and closely 
resemble those used by domestic taxpayers.  Dramatic examples of international tax avoidance that 
qualify as evasion – such as knowingly underreporting income to tax authorities, or filing false 
documents – are thought to be uncommon among large corporate taxpayers, though possibly more 
common among individual taxpayers.  Very little is known about the determinants or magnitude of 
international tax evasion, since the self-reported data that serve as the basis of analysis not 
surprisingly reveal nothing about it. 
The financing of foreign affiliates presents straightforward opportunities for international 
tax avoidance.  If an American parent company finances its investment in a foreign subsidiary with 
equity funds, then its foreign profits are taxable in the host country and no taxes are owed the U.S. 
government until the profits are repatriated to the United States.  The alternative of financing the 
foreign subsidiary with debt from the parent company generates interest deductions for the 
subsidiary that reduce its taxable income, and generates taxable interest receipts for the parent 
company. 
Simple tax considerations therefore often make it attractive to use debt to finance foreign 
affiliates in high-tax countries and to use equity to finance affiliates in low-tax countries.
69  The 
evidence is broadly consistent with these incentives.  Hines and Hubbard (1990) find that the 
average foreign tax rate paid by subsidiaries remitting nonzero interest to their American parent 
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firms in 1984 exceeds the average foreign tax rate paid by subsidiaries with no interest payments, 
while the reverse pattern holds for dividend payments.  Grubert (1998) estimates separate equations 
for dividend, interest, and royalty payments by 3467 foreign subsidiaries to their parent American 
companies (and other members of controlled groups) in 1990, finding that high corporate tax rates 
in countries in which American subsidiaries are located are correlated with higher interest 
payments and lower dividend payout rates. 
Firms face certain tax and regulatory limits on their abilities to select among alternative 
methods of financing their foreign and domestic operations.  Many host countries limit the extent to 
which interest payments to foreign parent companies can be used to reduce the taxable incomes of 
local affiliates.  Cross-border payments of interest, dividends and royalties are commonly subject to 
special withholding taxes that can be reduced by the terms of bilateral tax treaties.  And, in the 
years since 1986, American companies with foreign operations have not been permitted to deduct 
all of their domestic interest expenses in calculating their U.S. tax liabilities.  Instead, firms may 
deduct a fraction of their U.S.-incurred interest expenses in determining taxable U.S. income, with 
the remainder of their interest expenses used to reduce any U.S. tax liabilities on foreign-source 
income.  In practical terms, what this means is that, in the years after 1986, American multinational 
companies with excess foreign tax credits (those whose foreign income is taxed at rates exceeding 
the U.S. tax rate) receive only partial interest deductions for their domestic borrowing expenses, the 
fraction being a function of the ratio of foreign to total assets.  American multinational firms with 
deficit foreign tax credits (those whose foreign income is taxed at rates less than the U.S. tax rate) 
receive the full benefits of interest deductions for domestic borrowing, since any interest expenses 
allocated against their foreign-source incomes nevertheless reduce U.S. tax liabilities that they 
would otherwise incur.   52
Collins and Shackelford (1992) examine financial responses to the introduction of the 
interest-allocation rules by considering changes in preferred stock issuances by multinational firms 
after 1986.  Preferred stock is a natural substitute for debt, but U.S. law does not treat payments to 
holders of preferred stock as interest, making such payments nondeductible and also not subject to 
allocation to foreign source under the terms of the Tax Reform Act of 1986.  Collins and 
Shackelford find that, among the Fortune 100, firms with higher ratios of foreign to domestic assets 
– for whom higher fractions of interest expense are allocated against foreign income – are more 
likely than others to issue preferred stock after 1986.  Since these issuances coincide with changing 
tax incentives, they are likely to represent reactions to changing tax rules, but this does not rule out 
the possibility that at least some of these large multinational firms may have issued preferred stock 
for reasons unrelated to tax considerations in the years after 1986. 
Altshuler and Mintz (1995) examine confidential information provided by eight American 
multinational firms, finding a high correlation between tax costs imposed by interest allocation and 
propensities to borrow abroad after 1986.  Since foreign and domestic borrowing are substitutes, 
this correlation is consistent with the results reported by Collins and Shackelford, and suggests that 
firms respond to higher domestic borrowing costs by actively pursuing financial substitutes. 
Froot and Hines (1995) analyze a sample of 416 large American multinationals, finding that 
firms most adversely affected by the 1986 tax change do the least borrowing (as a fraction of 
assets) after 1986.  They distinguish firms with foreign operations located in high-tax countries 
from firms with foreign operations located in low-tax countries.  For all firms, the 1986 change 
reduces interest deductions allocated against domestic income and increases interest deductions 
allocated against foreign income.  This reallocation has no effect on taxes paid to foreign 
governments, while it increases domestic tax liabilities if firms have excess foreign tax credits.  In   53
the absence of changing tax incentives, there is no particular reason to expect firms in these two 
groups to exhibit differing borrowing patterns around 1986.  The estimates imply that firms with 
excess foreign tax credits and half of their assets abroad borrow five percent less annually after 
1986 than do firms without excess foreign tax credits.  Affected firms also exhibit slower rates of 
accumulation of plant and equipment after 1986, and are more likely than other firms to lease plant 
and equipment after 1986. 
Contractual arrangements between related parties located in countries with different tax 
rates offer numerous possibilities for sophisticated (and unsophisticated) tax avoidance.  It is 
widely suspected that firms adjust transfer prices used in within-firm transactions with the goal of 
reducing their total tax obligations.  Multinational firms typically can benefit by reducing prices 
charged by affiliates in high-tax countries for items and services provided to affiliates in low-tax 
countries.  OECD governments require firms to use transfer prices that would be paid by unrelated 
parties, but enforcement is difficult, particularly when pricing issues concern unique items such as 
patent rights.  Given the looseness of the resulting legal restrictions, it is entirely possible for firms 
to adjust transfer prices in a tax-sensitive fashion without even violating any laws. 
The evidence of tax-motivated transfer pricing comes in several forms. Grubert and Mutti 
(1991) and Hines and Rice (1994) analyze the aggregate reported profitabilities of U.S affiliates in 
different foreign locations in 1982.  Grubert and Mutti examine profit/equity and profit/sales ratios 
of U.S.-owned manufacturing affiliates in 29 countries, while Hines and Rice regress the 
profitability of all U.S.-owned affiliates in 59 countries against capital and labor inputs and local 
productivities.  Grubert and Mutti report that high taxes reduce the reported after-tax profitability of 
local operations; Hines and Rice find considerably larger effects (one percent tax rate differences 
are associated with 2.3 percent differences in before-tax profitability) in their data.     54
The reported low profit rates of foreign-owned firms in the United States over the last 20 
years is a source of concern to observers who suspect foreign investors of transferring profits 
earned in the United States to low-tax jurisdictions offshore.  Grubert et al. (1993) use firm-level 
tax return data to compare the tax liabilities of foreign-owned firms in the United States with the 
tax liabilities of otherwise-similar American-owned firms in 1987.  They report that approximately 
50 percent of the difference in the reported U.S. tax obligations of foreign and domestic firms is 
explainable on the basis of observable characteristics such as firm sizes and ages.  The other 50 
percent may reflect the use of aggressive transfer pricing by those foreign investors with stronger 
incentives than American firms to shift taxable income out of the United States, though it may also 
simply capture the effect of important omitted variables. 
Harris et al. (1993) report that the U.S. tax liabilities of American firms with tax haven 
affiliates are significantly lower than those of otherwise-similar American firms over the 1984-
1988 period, which may be indirect evidence of aggressive transfer-pricing by firms with tax haven 
affiliates.  As Grubert and Slemrod (1998) observe, it is difficult to attach a structural interpretation 
to this pattern, since firms endogenously select the locations of their foreign affiliates; nevertheless, 
this evidence suggests an important role for tax havens in facilitating international tax avoidance.  
Collins et al. (1998) analyze a pooled sample of U.S. multinationals over 1984-1992, finding a 
similar pattern of greater reported foreign profitability (normalized by foreign sales) among firms 
facing foreign tax rates below the U.S. rate.  The reduction in the U.S. statutory corporate tax rate 
from 46 percent in 1986 to 34 percent in 1988 offers another method of identifying propensities to 
shift reported profits internationally.  Klassen et al. (1993) find that American multinationals report 
book returns on equity in the United States that rose by 10 percent over this time period relative to 
reported book returns in their foreign operations.  The very limited nature of publicly available data   55
on even the location of foreign operations makes it difficult, however, to discern the extent to 
which this change is attributable to changing economic conditions in the United States and abroad. 
Patterns of reported profitability are consistent with other indicators of aggressive tax-
avoidance behavior, such as the use of royalties to remit profits from abroad and to generate tax 
deductions in host countries.  Hines (1995) finds that royalty payments from foreign affiliates of 
American companies in 1989 exhibit a –0.4 elasticity with respect to the tax cost of paying 
royalties, and Grubert (1998) also reports significant effects of tax rates on royalty payments by 
American affiliates in 1990.  Clausing (2001) finds that reported trade patterns between American 
parent companies and their foreign affiliates, and those between foreign affiliates located in 
different countries, are consistent with transfer-pricing incentives.  Controlling for various affiliate 
characteristics, including their trade balances with unaffiliated foreigners, Clausing finds that ten 
percent higher local tax rates are associated with 4.4 percent lower trade surpluses with parent 
companies.  This pattern is suggestive of pricing practices that move taxable profits out of high-tax 
jurisdictions. 
Multinational firms can adjust the timing of their dividend repatriations from foreign 
subsidiaries to reduce the associated tax liabilities, and there is considerable evidence that they do.  
Many countries, including the United States, tax the income of foreign subsidiaries only when 
repatriated as dividends, so multinational firms are able to defer home country taxation by 
reinvesting their profits abroad.  Hines and Hubbard (1990) examine tax return information for the 
foreign subsidiaries of American firms in 1984, finding that only 16 percent paid positive dividends 
to their parent companies in that year.  Foreign subsidiaries were more likely to pay dividends to 
parent companies if the associated tax costs were low and if parent companies also paid sizable 
dividends to their common shareholders.  Altshuler and Newlon (1993) report similar findings in   56
their analysis of tax return data for 1986.  Desai et al. (2001) compare the behavior of American-
owned foreign subsidiaries, whose dividend repatriations may trigger U.S. tax liabilities, with the 
behavior of American-owned foreign branches, whose income is taxable by the United States 
whether or not it is repatriated as dividends.  Foreign subsidiaries in low-tax locations are 
significantly less likely to repatriate dividends than are either branches in the same countries or 
subsidiaries in high-tax locations; the results indicate that one percent higher repatriation taxes are 
associated with one percent lower dividend payments.  Altshuler et al. (1995) find transitory tax 
costs to have much larger effects on dividend payments than do permanent tax costs in their panel 
of American-owned foreign subsidiaries in 1980, 1982, 1984, and 1986.  This estimated difference 
between the effects of transitory and permanent tax costs is consistent with Hartman’s (1985) 
insight that, while transitory tax costs should affect the timing of dividend repatriations, permanent 
costs should not, since permanent costs must be paid ultimately and are not reduced by deferral.  It 
remains an open question, however, to what extent permanent tax costs can be accurately identified 
in a panel covering four years. 
The form of a business organization can affect its tax obligation, thereby creating incentives 
for tax avoidance through the endogenous selection of organizational forms.  The U.S. Tax Reform 
Act of 1986 introduced an important distinction between the tax treatment of income received from 
majority-owned foreign affiliates of American companies and income received from foreign joint 
ventures owned 50 percent or less by Americans.  After 1986, Americans were required to calculate 
separate foreign-tax-credit limits for dividends received from each minority-owned joint venture.  
This change greatly reduces the attractiveness of joint ventures, particularly those in low-tax 
foreign countries.  Desai and Hines (1999a) report that American participation in international joint 
ventures fell sharply after 1986, in spite of rising joint venture activity by non-American   57
multinational firms.  The drop in American joint venture activity is most pronounced in low-tax 
countries, which is consistent with changing tax incentives, and for which there is no obvious non-
tax explanation.  Moreover, joint ventures in low-tax countries use more debt and pay greater 
royalties to their American parents after 1986, reflecting their incentives to economize on dividend 
payments. 
The location and intensity of R&D activity also appears to reflect tax avoidance incentives.  
Hines (1993) compares changes in the growth rate of R&D spending from 1984-1989 by firms with 
and without excess foreign tax credits in a sample of 116 multinational companies.  The U.S. R&D 
expense allocation rules are similar to those for interest: multinational firms with excess foreign tax 
credits faced higher tax costs of performing R&D in the United States after 1986, while firms 
without excess foreign tax credits were unaffected.  What distinguish firms in these two groups are 
their average foreign tax rates, which are more or less randomly distributed (in the sense of being 
uncorrelated with R&D spending in the years before 1986).  R&D spending levels of firms in the 
first group grew more slowly than those of firms in the second group, the implied elasticity of 
demand for R&D lying between –0.8 and –1.8 in alternative specifications of the R&D demand 
equation. 
  International differences in royalty withholding taxes offer evidence of the substitutability 
of R&D in different locations.  Higher royalty taxes raise the cost of imported technology, which in 
turn stimulates local R&D if imported technology and local R&D are substitutes, and discourages 
local R&D if they are complements.  Hines (1995) finds that American-owned foreign affiliates are 
more R&D-intensive if located in countries that impose high withholding taxes on royalty 
payments, and similarly, that foreign firms investing in the United States are more R&D-intensive 
if they are subject to higher royalty withholding tax rates.  These results suggest that imported   58
technology and locally produced technology are substitutes, and that multinational firms respond to 
tax rate differences by undertaking such substitution.  Hines and Jaffe (2001), however, find that 
American multinational firms for which the tax cost of performing R&D in the United States 
became most expensive after 1986 exhibited the slowest subsequent growth in foreign patenting, 
which suggests a complementary relationship between domestic and foreign research. 
  International tax avoidance is evidently a successful activity.  The reported profitability of 
multinational firms is inversely related to local tax rates, a relationship that is at least partly the 
consequence of tax-motivated use of debt financing, the pricing of intrafirm transfers, royalty 
payments, and other methods.  It is important not to lose sight of the fact that, in spite of the 
demonstrated ability of multinational firms to arrange their affairs to avoid taxes, these large 
corporations nevertheless pay enormous sums in taxes each year.  Tax avoidance appears to be 
limited by available opportunities and the enforcement activities of governments.   
 
5.2.  Reconciling theory and evidence 
  This section considers the degree to which the behavior of multinational firms is consistent 
with the implications of theoretical models, an exercise that serves to identify useful and promising 
directions in which to extend existing theory. 
 
5.2.1.  Multinationals as financial intermediaries 
Consider first a model in which multinationals are simply vehicles through which domestic 
residents can invest abroad.  In particular, assume that multinationals possess the same technology 
as other firms, operate in a competitive environment, cannot avoid reporting to the tax authorities 
their true incomes from investments in each location, and face no uncertainty.   59
If multinationals serve simply as financial intermediaries, then individuals will invest 
abroad through multinationals rather than through portfolio investment if the transactions costs of 
doing so are cheaper, there are tax savings from use of multinationals, or multinationals are better 
able to locate the most profitable investments.  For example, when countries have dividend 
imputation schemes, then investors face strong tax incentives to invest abroad through 
multinationals.  Rather than exploring the relative advantages of portfolio investments vs. direct 
investments, however, we take as given here the total amount invested abroad through 
multinationals and focus instead on the location of this investment.  By assumption, multinationals 
have access to the same constant-returns-to-scale technology as other firms, so that their 
investments are equivalent to the purchase of equity in local firms.  It is useful to consider whether 
this model’s implied pattern of multinational behavior is consistent with the observations 
summarized in the previous section. 
If the corporate tax in all countries simply taxed the return to capital physically located in 
that country, then in equilibrium the rate of return on capital net of local corporate tax rates should 
be equilibrated across countries.
70  More formally, fk
i(1-τi) should be the same for all i, where fk
i is 
the marginal product of capital in country i and τi is the corporate tax rate in that country.  This 
condition reflects the impact of international mobility of portfolio capital.  Based on tax 
considerations alone, therefore, all multinationals would be indifferent to where they locate, 
regardless of their home countries. 
Many capital exporting countries include any income from foreign subsidiaries in the parent 
firm’s taxable corporate income, and in compensation offer credits for income and withholding 
                                                 
70 In particular, the local wage rate must drop by enough to compensate for a higher corporate tax rate, so that firms can 
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taxes paid to foreign governments.
71  It is worth considering whether this complication explains 
observed investment patterns.  In order to simplify the setting, and at the expense of some realism, 
suppose that the home country taxes foreign income at accrual rather than at repatriation, and also 
that foreign tax credits are applied only against tax liabilities created by the income stream 
associated with the credits.  Then if the marginal product of capital net of local corporate tax is 
equated across countries, so that fk
i(1-τi) is the same for all i (and therefore can be denoted r), the 
availability of the foreign tax credit implies that the net-of-corporate-tax return to a multinational 
investor from country j equals () (1 max( , )) max ,0
i
ki j j i fr ττ τ τ −= − − .   This condition implies that 
a multinational firm will earn a return r in all countries with corporate tax rates above the firm’s 
home country tax rate, but will face domestic tax surcharges and therefore earn a lower rate of 
return when investing in countries with lower corporate tax rates.  With a sufficient number of 
available investments earning r, multinationals should be indifferent among countries with higher 
tax rates than the domestic rate, and avoid investing in countries with a corporate tax rate below the 
domestic rate.  This forecast is clearly counterfactual, given the evidence that FDI is a declining 
function of tax rates in host countries. 
With a sufficient volume of investment abroad by multinationals from countries with high 
corporate tax rates, it is possible that some FDI will be located in lower tax rate countries despite 
the tax penalty.  Specifically, the equilibrium might include multinationals from country k investing 
in countries with tax rates above some τj, with τj < τk.  For all host countries with τ < τk, the pretax 
return to capital in equilibrium will be the same as that available in country k, despite their lower 
tax rates, in order to be able to attract FDI from these multinationals.  Portfolio investors from 
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taxes due on domestic-source income.  Home-country taxation of the income of separately-incorporated foreign 
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country k, however, then have a tax advantage over multinationals when investing in these 
countries with τ < τk, since they do not face the corporate surtax at repatriation.
72  Also, local 
investors in these host countries would earn a higher after-tax return at home than in countries with 
higher corporate tax rates.  Only under extreme conditions, however, would this theory be able 
explain why FDI is located in tax havens.   
With worldwide averaging of repatriated profits, these forecasts need to be modified.  If a 
multinational now invests Kl in a country with a low corporate tax rate, say τl, it simply needs to 
invest enough in some country with high corporate rate, say τh, so that the excess credits received 
from taxes paid in the high-tax country at least offset any domestic taxes due on the investments in 
the low-tax country.  This occurs if  [ ]
hl h l
hh k ll k j h k l k K fK f K f K f ττ τ +≥ +  
where τj is the home country tax rate.  If all investments earn r net of local taxes, then this 
investment strategy earns r net of all taxes.  Now FDI can occur in tax havens, but only if matched 
by enough FDI in high-tax countries. 
The evidence indicates, however, that multinational investments are concentrated in 
countries with low corporate tax rates, and that the rate of investment is a declining function of the 
local corporate tax rate.  This evidence is therefore inconsistent with forecasts of models in which 
multinational firms are simply financial intermediaries. 
One possible explanation for the existence of FDI in low-tax countries was proposed by 
Hartman (1985).  He notes that standard models focus on foreign investments financed by funds 
provided by parent firms, even though most FDI is financed by retained earnings of existing 
subsidiaries.  When an existing subsidiary considers whether to repatriate a dollar of profits now or 
reinvest this dollar and repatriate profits later, it will choose whichever option generates the highest 
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present value of repatriations.  If the new investment earns the going rate of return, and the 
repatriation tax rate is constant over time, then Hartman shows that the firm will be indifferent 
between the two.
73  The key insight, drawn from the model of dividend behavior of Auerbach 
(1979) and Bradford (1981), is that the opportunity cost of the investment to the parent firm and the 
future profits earned on the investment are both equally reduced by the repatriation tax, so that the 
required rate of return on the investment is unaffected by the size of the repatriation tax.  As a 
result, once a subsidiary is located in a low-tax-rate country, it has no incentive to move.   
  It is useful to examine the properties of this model of the firm, since they illustrate several 
aspects of the behavior of profit-maximizing multinational firms.
74  Consider the incentives of a 
firm that produces output with a concave production function Q=f(K*t), in which K*t is the capital 
stock employed by the subsidiary in year t, and the f(.) function subsumes profit-maximizing 
choices of labor and other inputs.  Q is output net of capital depreciation, and home and host 
countries’ tax systems apply true economic depreciation for tax purposes.  Output is sold locally at 
an unchanging price taken to be unity and parametric to the firm. 
The parent firm chooses the real and financial policies of its subsidiary to maximize the 
present value of the parent’s after-tax cash flow.  Let β  represent the (annual) factor used to 
discount future after-tax cash flows (in the hand of the parent corporation).  Denote by Dt the 
dividend payment from the subsidiary to the parent in period t; by definition,  0 ≥ t D .  Home-
country taxation of foreign-source income, together with provision of foreign tax credits, reduces 
the after-tax value of a dividend payment of Dt to  () ( ) * 1 1 τ τ − − t D .  For firms with mature foreign 
investments that use accumulated foreign profits to finance dividends paid to the parent company 
                                                                                                                                                                 
see Gordon and Jun (1993). 
73 If the repatriation tax rate varies over time, then the model forecasts that the incentive to invest is high when the 
repatriation tax rate is high, while repatriations will be high when the tax rate is low.   63
and any future foreign investments, the value (Va) of their interest in the foreign affiliate is given 
by: 












−  =  −  ∑ . 
From (5.1), it is clear that the policies that maximize Va are identical to those that would 
maximize the present value of dividends in the absence of home-country taxation.  Specifically, 
firms have incentives to reinvest foreign profits in their foreign operations up to the point that the 
after-foreign tax rate of return equals the opportunity cost of funds, or  ()
* 1* k f τβ −= .  Since the 
repatriation tax is unavoidable to a firm financing investments out of foreign retained earnings, then 
its presence does not affect repatriation policies.  This argument is identical to that in the corporate 
tax literature on “trapped equity” models of corporate dividends (see the chapter by Auerbach in 
volume 3 of this Handbook).  As in the corporate tax literature, firms would incur unnecessary tax 
costs if they were simultaneously to inject equity funds from the parent company while remitting 
from subsidiaries dividends on which net home country tax liabilities are due. 
Of course, repatriation taxes reduce the after-tax value of foreign investments, and thereby 
tend to reduce ex ante investment levels, since firms demand higher pre-tax rates of return in 
settings with significant repatriation taxes.  In selecting initial foreign investment levels, forward-
looking firms that anticipate future repatriation taxes have incentives to keep the capitalization of 
foreign affiliates at modest levels, since doing so prolongs the period before dividends are paid and 
home country taxation incurred.  Sinn (1993) and Hines (1994) generalize the Hartman model to 
include this consideration, and Hines (1994) notes that this initial underinvestment makes it 
profitable for multinational firms to use significant levels of debt finance, even in low-tax 
countries.  Of course, this consideration applies only to the extent that multinational firms actually 
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incur repatriation taxes, since, as Hines and Rice (1994), Weichenreider (1996) and Altshuler and 
Grubert (forthcoming) note, there may be a large supply of attractive foreign investment 
opportunities to which foreign retained earnings might be devoted.  Hines (1988), Leechor and 
Mintz (1993), and Hines (1994) further generalize the Hartman model to situations in which home-
country taxation uses a different tax base definition than does taxation by foreign governments.  In 
this setting, marginal foreign investments have the potential to affect home-country taxation of 
inframarginal dividends received from abroad, and therefore repatriation taxes may influence 
repatriation patterns.  Illustrative calculations presented by Hines (1988) suggest that this effect 
may be sizable enough to remove much of the value of popular foreign investment incentives such 
as accelerated depreciation. 
  There are a number of other clear inconsistencies between this initial theory and data on 
multinationals.  If investments in equilibrium all yield the same rate of return r, net of source-based 
taxes, then the pre-tax rate of return in a country should be higher when the local corporate tax rate 
is higher.  Yet, as described above, reported pretax rates of returns of subsidiaries appear to be a 
decreasing function of the local corporate tax rate, with particularly high rates of return reported in 
tax havens.   Another important inconsistency is that the simple model cannot easily explain why 
countries have adopted such tax systems.  Worldwide averaging produces outcomes in which the 
allocation of capital might be the same as would have arisen with source-based corporate taxes in 
each country, in spite of home-country attempts to tax income at repatriation.  Yet such source-
based taxes remain inconsistent with the forecasts from the Diamond-Mirrlees (1971) framework.   
  
5.2.2.   Multinationals as corporate tax avoiders   65
The most striking inconsistency between this initial theory and observation is the very high 
reported rates of return in “tax havens.”  As noted above, the evidence suggests that multinationals 
actively make use of their abilities to reallocate taxable income from subsidiaries in countries with 
high corporate tax rates to those in countries with very low corporate tax rates.  There are several 
possible methods of reallocating income, including judicious choices of prices, interest rates, and 
royalty rates used for transactions between related parties, substitution between debt and equity 
finance, and careful consideration of where to locate investments that might become unusually 
profitable. 
  The following framework is useful in understanding the empirical work on tax-motivated 
profit shifting, since much of this work relies on the premise that the stringency of government 
enforcement of international tax rules is a function of the extent to which reported profits differ 
from those actually earned in each jurisdiction.  Consider the case in which a multinational firm 
earns true profits  0 > i ρ  in location i, but arranges transfer prices in order to report an additional 
profit of  i ψ  in the same location (in which  i ψ  might be negative).  The firm incurs compliance 
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The first order conditions for ψi imply: 

















where µ is the Lagrange multiplier  corresponding to the constraint (5.4).
75  We find, as expected 
that ψi>0 in low-tax countries, where τi<1-µ, and conversely.     
If firms invest facing an opportunity cost of funds of r, then the true marginal product of 
capital (denoted fK) will satisfy: 
(5.6)    
22 /[(1 )(1 / )] Ki i i fr τγ ψ ρ =− + . 
Without evasion, we instead would have found that  /(1 ). Ki fr τ =−  This is also the investment 
condition that would be faced by local firms, who cannot make use of foreign operations to reduce 
taxes.  A multinational firm’s avoidance opportunities therefore give it a competitive advantage 
over local firms to the extent that  0 i ψ ≠ .  Equation (5.5) implies that the size of this competitive 
advantage is larger in countries with more extreme tax rates, both small and large.  The investment 
pattern of multinationals should therefore be a U-shaped function of the local tax 
rate.
76Reallocating income into a tax haven avoids current tax liability.  However, home country 
taxes are deferred but not altogether avoided as long as profits must ultimately be repatriated.  
Some investors may nevertheless be able to avoid repatriation taxes as well.  One approach is to 
locate the parent firm itself in a tax haven.  Another approach is to remove profits from the tax 
haven subsidiary in a way that does not generate tax liabilities for the parent firm.  For example, the 
subsidiary can finance directly the expenditures (either at home or elsewhere abroad) that the parent 
firm would otherwise finance itself.  Alternatively, the firm can simply continue investing abroad in 
                                                 
75 The value of µ adjusts to ensure that (5.4) holds with equality.     67
other financial or real assets, earning the going rate of return pretax, thereby postponing any 
domestic taxes due at repatriation indefinitely.  A number of countries have adopted rules trying to 
restrict deferral to real investments only.
77Many but not all aspects of the behavior of 
multinationals are consistent with this focus on the role of multinationals as tax avoiders.  Certainly, 
income reallocation efforts can explain the low observed pretax profit rates in high-tax countries, and 
the high profit rates in low-tax countries.  However, income reallocation also implies that 
multinationals will invest more heavily in countries with extreme tax rates, both low and high.  While 
the evidence does indicate substantial investment in tax havens,  it is not consistent with the forecast of 
substantial investment as well in high-tax countries. 
The theory also does not easily rationalize observed tax policies.  Standard models indicate 
that the optimal source-based tax rate on capital income is zero.  If firms can easily reallocate 
profits in response to tax rate differences, this only reinforces a country’s incentive to reduce its 
source-based tax rate – and these incentives were sufficient, even without income shifting, to drive 
tax rates to zero.  Given the evidence reported by Gordon and Slemrod (1988) and Kalambokidis 
(1992) that capital taxes in the United States (between the mid-1970's and the mid-1980's) collected 
no net revenue, perhaps tax policy in practice is not all that distant from the forecasts of the theory.  
Actual policy, however, generates a wide range of more detailed distortions, however, that are also 
inconsistent with the theory. 
One further complication is that multinational firms can avoid taxes not only on their capital 
income but also on the income generated by the ideas and efforts of the entrepreneurs responsible 
                                                                                                                                                                 
76 In countries with high tax rates, multinationals have advantages over local firms, because they are able to reallocate 
taxable profits to reduce the impact of the high local taxes.  Their advantage over local firms in tax havens stems from 
the desirability of tax haven operations as recipients of taxable income reallocated from elsewhere.     
77 For example, the U.S. Subpart F rules impose tax at accrual on any income earned on financial investments abroad.  
As noted by Weichenrieder (1996), these provisions make real investments abroad more attractive, distorting allocation 
decisions.  68
for the firm.  In particular, rather than receiving wage payments in return for their efforts, which are 
then taxable under the personal income tax, entrepreneurs can instead leave their earnings within 
the firm, so that they are taxed as corporate income.
78  Through adept income reallocation, the 
earnings might then even be taxed at as low a rate as that available in a tax haven, rather than the 
domestic corporate tax rate.  Under an optimal labor income tax, this return to entrepreneurial effort 
would be taxed at the same rate as applies to the return to efforts expended elsewhere.
79  
Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1995) explore ways in which tax policy can be designed to 
deal with this threat of tax avoidance on the earnings of entrepreneurs.   In a closed economy, the 
solution would be simply to impose a corporate tax at a rate equal to the top personal tax rate.  In an 
open economy, in which firms can reallocate taxable profits between countries, enforcement is 
more difficult.  If any foreign profits must ultimately be repatriated, then Gordon and MacKie-
Mason argue that the same outcome is achieved by including the cash-flow between the parent and 
the subsidiary in the corporate tax base, e.g. tax all repatriations in full but allow a deduction for all 
funds sent abroad.  If foreign profits cannot be fully taxed at repatriation, however, perhaps due to 
detection problems, then the corporate tax rate should be set below the labor income tax rate but 
above the corporate tax rates in tax havens, trading off domestic and international income shifting.  
 
5.2.3.  Multinationals as owners of intangible capital 
Another theoretical modification suggested by the data is that multinational firms possess 
intangible capital, in the form of unique technologies or products, which they can profitably exploit 
                                                 
78 When earnings are retained, entrepreneurs may then owe taxes on realized capital gains at some point in the future 
when they sell their shares in the firm.
79 If entrepreneurial effort generates positive externalities, however, then a reduced tax rate on this form of effort 
could be justified.  See Gordon (1998) for further discussion.  69
in foreign countries.
80  As a result, multinationals earn returns on their intangible capital as well as 
on any physical capital they own.  This modification is commonly used outside the tax literature in 
order to explain the economic role of multinationals.
81 
When multinational firms possess such intangible capital, competition need not eliminate all 
pure profits.  Multinationals therefore face even greater pressure to locate any pure profits in 
countries with low corporate tax rates.  For example, if the fixed factor responsible for diminishing 
returns to scale is a limited number of skilled and trusted managers, these managers along with 
their subsidiary can in principle be relocated between countries.  Consider the case in which the 
costs of relocating are zero, e.g. all other employees are perfect substitutes across locations.  In 
particular, let the subsidiary earn the same pure profits, π, regardless of the country in which it is 
located.  Due to the scarcity of managers available to oversee the technology, the multinational will 
invest in only those few countries that yield the highest net-of-tax return.  Ignoring the repatriation 
tax, a subsidiary would earn a net-of-tax income of  () ( ) 1 nn fK πτ +−    in country n, leaving it a 
net profit of  () n τ π − 1  after compensating investors at the going rate of return.
82  Without a 
repatriation tax, the firm would then want to locate all of its subsidiaries in tax havens. 
  In contrast, if profits are repatriated every year and subject to tax at repatriation, then the 
firm’s net-of-tax income from its foreign subsidiary becomes: 
















                                                 
80 Leasing technology is an alternative to FDI, but encounters many difficulties.  The lessee cannot easily be assured 
that they will gain access to all the information that is valuable in operating the unique technology effectively, while the 
lessor will fear competition from the lessee both in the product market and in the market for access to the technology.
81 See, e.g., Dunning (1985). 
82This is based on the assumption that, in equilibrium,  () ( ) 1 nn f Kr τ −= .     70
 in which  h τ  is the corporate tax rate in the home country.  Now the firm strictly prefers to establish 
subsidiaries in countries with corporate tax rates just equal to  h τ  -- net of tax profits are lower in 
countries with both lower and higher corporate tax rates.  As a result, FDI should be greatest in 
countries with “average” corporate tax rates. 
   If instead repatriation is postponed until date T, then the net return to investing in the 
subsidiary equals: 








− − + + − − + + 0 ,
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τ π τ π . 
 In the limit as T becomes large, this expression will again be largest for subsidiaries located in tax 
havens, and the shift occurs at a lower T for firms earning greater fractions of their returns in the 
form of pure profits.   The observed FDI in tax havens could then represent investments by 
multinationals that earn high pure profits and that can postpone repatriating these profits for a 
considerable period of time. 
If subsidiaries earning the highest pure profits are pushed into tax havens, whereas those 
earning closer to a normal rate of return are confined to countries with corporate tax rates above the 
domestic tax rate, then this model helps explain the higher reported rate of return in tax havens.  If 
many multinationals do earn large pure profits, then it also explains their observed concentration in 
tax havens.   
This argument assumes that subsidiaries are costlessly mobile.  The alternative extreme 
assumption is that the firm can profitably sell its output in a country only by locating a subsidiary 
there, as might be true when exports from operations elsewhere incur very high transportation   71
costs.  The firm then establishes a subsidiary in a country only if local taxes are not too high.
83  
Assume, for example, a world of monopolistic competition among multinationals, where each 
multinational in equilibrium earns just enough profits, aggregated across all its operations, to offset 
its initial R&D costs.
84 Assume, for example, that a subsidiary in country i earns profits of 
() , ii i f KR r K π ≡−  before royalty payments, in which Ki is the subsidiary's capital stock, R is the 
amount of R&D it has undertaken, and  () f ⋅  is a concave production function.  The multinational 
could then face a cost function c(R), and choose R to maximize worldwide profits.   
This model implies that the government in a small country i would want to impose a 100 
percent cash-flow tax on the subsidiary, i.e. not allow any deductions for royalty payments or R&D 
expenses.
85 The tax collects revenue yet creates no offsetting efficiency costs from the perspective 
of a small country, since a cash-flow tax does not distort the subsidiary's choice of Ki and a small 
country can ignore the implications of the tax for R.
86  Taken together, however, these tax policies 
make R&D unattractive, leading to an inefficient outcome. 
While multinational firms can select the locations of their foreign subsidiaries, some 
countries may prove to be significantly more attractive than the next best alternatives, perhaps due 
to high costs of producing elsewhere and shipping to local customers.  In such countries profits 
                                                 
83 Note that the relevant tax rate is then the average tax rate, since the firm faces a zero-one decision.  For further 
discussion, see Devereux and Griffith (1998). 
84 Firms in principle would then report zero profits in each location, after R&D costs are divided appropriately across 
locations.  However, there are no clear rules for dividing these R&D expenses across subsidiaries.  The purpose of the 
analysis is to analyze what effective tax rates host countries would prefer to impose on local subsidiaries.  Such taxes 
(if positive) may then be implemented through restrictions on deductions for royalty payments and R&D expenses, or 
withholding taxes on royalty payments. 
85In general, a cash-flow tax falls only on any existing assets of the firm, since new investment is deductible.  By the 
same logic a government may attempt to expropriate such existing assets through a 100% cash flow tax. If anticipated, 
however, the original investment would not have occurred.  R&D is different, since the investment is a public good 
from the perspective of each country, so should be only modestly affected by any one country’s cash-flow tax, even if 
anticipated.   
86 Huizinga (1992) and Mintz and Tulkens (1990) explore a closely related problem in which the host country is 
restricted to taxing the return to capital investments at the same rate as applies to pure profits, and also find that the 
optimal tax rates on foreign--owned subsidiaries are positive.   72
taxes on multinationals can survive in equilibrium.  However, the maximum profit tax rate that 
avoids inducing subsidiaries to relocate varies by firm.  As tax rates rise, a larger fraction of 
potential investment moves elsewhere.  This relocation causes local wage rates to fall and local 
customers to face higher prices.  These costs will limit the size of the optimal tax rate on 
multinationals. 
Another issue that arises when multinationals own intangible capital is the difficulty of 
enforcing intellectual property rights.  Multinational firms cannot necessarily rely on host 
governments to prevent local firms from learning and making use of its subsidiary’s proprietary 
technology.  It is not even clear that the rigorous enforcement of intellectual property rights is the 
most efficient policy, since the incentives for R&D activity need to be balanced against the 
efficiency gains from having existing technologies employed widely in production.
87  Even if 
rigorous enforcement were the most efficient policy from a global perspective, however, this does 
not mean than every country individually would gain from such rigorous enforcement -- countries 
with no technologies to sell would almost surely lose from it.  As a result, if a country is in a 
position to impose some additional cost on local subsidiaries without inducing exit, then it may 
choose to do so by aiding domestic firms to gain use of the technology owned by the foreign 
multinational instead of collecting cash payments from the firm.   The choice between these 
alternative “taxes” would largely depend on the size of the gain to local firms from access to the 
technology compared to the cost to the multinational from the resulting additional competition.  If 
local firms produce noncompeting goods, for example, then the leakage of  information imposes 
little or no cost on the multinational.  When the losses to the multinational from leakage of 
information about its proprietary technology to local firms is large enough to prevent it from   73
entering, yet the gains to these local firms exceed the loss to the multinational, the host government 
may even want to subsidize multinationals to locate subsidiaries there. 
  The above arguments assume, however, that financial profits  i π  must be reported in the 
same location as the physical capital Kn responsible for production.  To some degree, the 
multinational firm can relocate its financial profits independently of its physical operations.  For 
example, if its subsidiary in a tax haven owns the key patents, the firm can then make royalty 
payments from its operations elsewhere to this tax haven subsidiary in an attempt to have  i π  taxed 
at a low rate while maintaining flexibility over the physical location of the rest of its operations.
88  
Firms with excess foreign tax credits are in even simpler situations, since they are effectively 
untaxed by their home countries on any foreign-source royalty income, and therefore have 
incentives to locate patent ownership in parent firms. 
 
5.2.4.   Testing alternative explanations 
There remain two plausible – and nonexclusive – explanations for the dominant role of FDI, 
particularly in tax havens, and the high reported profit rates of subsidiaries that do locate in tax 
havens: tax avoidance activity and multinational ownership of intangible capital. Their forecasts 
differ sharply, however.  Multinational ownership of intangible capital implies that tax havens 
would attract subsidiaries from industries earning the highest rates of pure profits, whereas tax 
avoidance implies that tax havens would instead attract firms that can most easily reallocate profits 
without detection.  Also, the subsidiaries located in high tax countries would report below normal 
profit rates if profit reallocation were important, while they would report normal profits if the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
87 Because of fixed factors of production, the multinational may not be able to pursue all profitable uses of its 
technology, yet find it difficult to design a contract to sell or lease the information to other firms that can profitably 
employ the technology.    74
explanation for the dominant role of FDI were the existence of intangible capital.  Another 
difference between the two explanations is that the gain from adjusting transfer prices is the same 
whether FDI takes the form of acquiring an existing firm or establishing a new firm (greenfield 
investment), as long as the ease of profit reallocation is the same.  If multinational investment 
instead occurs because of the important role of intangible capital, then multinationals would again 
be indifferent between acquisitions and greenfield investment when investing in high-tax countries.  
They would invest in low-tax countries, however, only if it is possible to earn a high enough profit 
rate, which rules out acquiring an existing firm.
89 Therefore, FDI in tax havens would be limited to 
greenfield investment.  Finally, predicted FDI is a U-shaped function of the local tax rate with 
income reallocation, but an L-shaped function of the local tax rate in the presence of intangible 
capital.  Another source of evidence on the relative merit of competing explanations for the 
dominant role of FDI and the large multinational presence in tax havens is the response to the U.S. 
Tax Reform Act of 1986.  Following this Act, FDI in the United States increased substantially 
(Hines, 1996a).  One explanation proposed by Scholes et al. (2002) is that U.S. firms faced an 
effective tax increase as a result of the tax reform, but that foreign-owned subsidiaries who owe 
further home-country taxes when they repatriate their profits would not be as much affected by the 
tax increase, since they receive extra credits against their home-country taxes to compensate for the 
extra U.S. tax payments.  This explanation does not clarify, however, why the foreign subsidiaries 
are located in the United States.  If foreign investors do in fact owe additional taxes at repatriation, 
then they would not want to locate in the United States if by doing so they earn no more than the 
                                                                                                                                                                 
88 Host governments, however, may attempt to limit this process, for example by restricting the size of royalty 
payments or imposing withholding taxes on them. 











.  If the multinational 
acquired the firm, it would end up with lower profits net of tax because of the taxes due at repatriation yet would still 
face a required rate of return of r.  Therefore, it could not afford to pay enough to convince the current owners to sell.   75
going net-of-tax rate of return r.  If opportunities for income reallocation were the reason for their 
presence in the United States, then the reduction in the statutory tax rate in 1986 would reduce the 
gains from adept transfer pricing, making U.S. investment less attractive. If foreigners invest in the 
United States in order to earn pure profits by exploiting firm-specific intangible assets, then the 
drop in the U.S. statutory tax rate could well leave them with a larger share of these pure profits 
after tax, making further investment in the United States more attractive than before.  This 
explanation most likely predicts an increase in greenfield investments, however, since any firms 
wishing to make use of a unique technology would normally find it cheaper to build a plant 
incorporating the technology directly rather than convert an existing plant.  Yet the observed 
increase in FDI primarily took the form of acquisitions (Auerbach and Hassett, 1993).   One factor 
that does help explain the observed jump in foreign acquisitions of U.S. equity is simply that the 
fall in U.S. personal income tax rates, and the rise in capital gains taxation, induced American 
investors to shift their portfolios away from equity towards bonds.  In equilibrium, foreign residents 
facing high personal tax rates would then acquire this equity.  The importance of dividend 
imputation schemes abroad, for example, could then explain why foreigners acquired U.S. equity 
through FDI rather than portfolio investment.  This portfolio reallocation process is very much 
consistent with a jump in acquisitions but not greenfield investment. 
6.  Understanding Existing International Tax Provisions 
Tax systems in the world today differ substantially from those implied by the simple 
theories reviewed in section 2.  Source-based corporate income is taxed at high rates by all major 
capital importing countries, and has been so for years, in spite of any competitive pressures to 
reduce tax rates to zero.  While personal taxes on capital income typically apply to the worldwide 
dividend and interest income of domestic residents, as forecast by the theory, in practice capital   76
flight significantly reduces the effective taxation of this source of income for residents of many 
countries.  The persistence of capital income taxation therefore also requires an explanation, since 
the threat of capital flight should exert substantial pressure to reduce or eliminate existing personal 
taxes on dividend and interest income.  This section considers directions in which the theory of 
international taxation might be modified in order to account for observed international tax 
practices. 
The discussion in section 5 draws attention to two important considerations that are not 
addressed by simple theories, the ability of multinational firms to reallocate taxable profits between 
countries, and the use of FDI to exploit firm-specific intangible assets.  Simply adding these 
complications to the initial models, however, only increases the implied pressure to reduce source-
based capital tax rates.  The ability of firms to reallocate taxable income and to earn pure profits 
from intangibles gives countries incentives to select corporate tax rates just below those prevailing 
elsewhere, since doing so increases the tax base both by attracting firms earning larger pure profits 
and by encouraging firms to report higher taxable incomes.  If countries are symmetric, the only 
resulting equilibrium is one in which all countries have zero source-based corporate tax rates. 
The pressure to reduce tax rates describes a form of tax competition that arises due to fiscal 
externalities.  When a country succeeds in increasing its tax base through a cut in its tax rate, much 
of this increase in tax base occurs through a reduction in the tax base elsewhere.  While in theory 
foreign individual workers and investors are indifferent at the margin to the resulting changes in 
investment patterns, foreign governments are not, since their tax bases fall and with them their tax 
revenues.   One government’s action therefore imposes a fiscal externality on other governments.  
In the presence of such externalities, the resulting equilibrium pattern of tax rates will be too low 
from the perspective of the various governments.  In particular, while each government would be   77
indifferent to a marginal increase in its tax rate starting from the equilibrium values, other 
governments would benefit from the increase, leading to a Pareto improvement.
90  However, 
observed attempts at policy coordination through bilateral tax treaties uniformly involve reductions 
rather than increases in tax rates, suggesting that fiscal externalities somehow produce tax rates that 
are too high rather than too low. 
Modifications to the simple theory of international taxation may help to explain the use of 
source-based taxes on capital income.  One modification is to incorporate the fact that capital once 
invested is commonly sunk.  While ex ante a country may not want to distort investment incentives 
through a source-based tax, ex post it would want to seize past investments, a classic time 
consistency problem.  This seizure is particularly tempting when the owners are foreign, so that 
their own welfare is of minimal policy concern.   Given the time inconsistency, however, a 
government would want to commit not to tax capital in the future, if possible, despite actually 
wanting to seize assets currently.  Other governments (of countries in which foreign investors 
reside) also would want to see such a commitment.  Both pressures are consistent with binding 
bilateral tax treaty agreements to reduce tax rates.   
A second modification, as in Huizinga (1992), is to posit that firms with unique 
technologies or other intangible assets may be able to earn rents in a country only by locating a 
subsidiary there.  The host country then can impose tax obligations as up to the size of these rents 
without changing the firm's location decision.
91  This tax discourages investment in R&D, but the 
resulting costs are shared worldwide. Equilibrium tax rates are therefore too high relative to those 
that would arise if countries could coordinate their policies.  When firms have market power, as 
                                                 
90 See Razin and Sadka (1991b) for further discussion. 
91 Since the country has no incentive to discourage local capital investment, it prefers to impose a cash-flow tax.   78
well as pure profits, additional complications arise in any model of optimal taxes, even in a closed 
economy.
92 
A third modification, explored in Gordon and MacKie-Mason (1995), concerns the 
implications of possible income shifting between the domestic personal and corporate tax bases.  
While a source-based corporate tax encourages firms to reallocate taxable profits abroad, it 
discourages employees from shifting their personal incomes into the corporate tax base.  If there 
were no tax on repatriated profits, then it would be possible to avoid taxes even on labor income.  
While there is no incentive per se in this model to tax foreign investors in the domestic economy, 
such taxes may still be needed to deter residents from disguising themselves as foreign investors.  
This generates an efficiency gain from using information sharing to detect foreign-source income 
rather than relying on taxes on ‘foreign’ investors, consistent with the provisions of many tax 
treaties. 
A final modification, suggested by the empirical findings of Feldstein and Horioka 
(1980) and the home bias literature and explored for example in Gordon and Varian (1989) and 
Gordon and Gaspar (2001), is to posit that capital investments are not so easily mobile across 
countries, due for example to risk diversification or hedging reasons.  If capital investments are less 
than perfectly mobile, then countries may find some taxation of capital investments to be attractive.  
Gordon and Gaspar argue, however, that this scenario provides only weak theoretical support for 




                                                 
92 See Devereux and Hubbard (2000)  for a recent attempt to extend such results to an open economy setting.   79
Economies are rapidly becoming more open, not only to trade in goods and services, but 
also to capital flows and even to labor migration.  This paper considers the effect of taxation on 
international business activity, and the implications of open borders for the taxation of capital 
income.  There is considerable evidence that international taxation influences the volume and 
location of foreign direct investment, and is responsible for a wide range of tax avoidance.  The 
observed responsiveness of international economic activity to its taxation carries direct implications 
for the formation of international tax policy and indirect, but no less important, implications for the 
formation of domestic tax policy.  Indeed, given the extent to which international considerations 
influence domestic tax choices, it is not clear whether countries are any longer able to pursue 
purely domestic tax policies. 
Any analysis of capital taxation in an open economy that seeks to be consistent with 
observed behavior and actual tax policies must consider the implications of tax avoidance, and 
should recognize the potential importance of investment driven by firm-specific intangible assets.  
Even these added complications do not explain certain aspects of individual behavior, such as 
“home bias” in financial portfolios, and are insufficient to rationalize easily the current tax 
treatment of capital income.  Since international considerations were afterthoughts in the design of 
most countries’ tax systems, it may be that policies around the world have yet to catch up with 
events.  There is a bright future for research on international taxation, not only because there are 
many unanswered questions and a worldwide laboratory to use in answering them, but also because 
the formulation of domestic as well as international tax policy turns on the answers. 
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